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I. INTRODUCTION
The word laïcité is used in France to summarize prevailing beliefs
regarding the proper relationship between religion and the French
state.2 A term that plays a similar role in the United States, albeit
2. Laïcité, which is often translated into English as “secular,” is a term that is difficult
to define and almost impossible to translate. “There is no firm definition of laïcité: neither
officially established nor generally accepted.” EMILE POULAT, NOTRE LAÏCITÉ PUBLIQUE 116
(2003) [hereinafter NOTRE LAÏCITÉ]. For a brief, but highly informative discussion of some of
the different usages of the term, see id. at 115–24. Le Grand Robert dictionary defines laïcité
as a “political notion involving the separation of civil society and religious society, the State
exercising no religious power and the churches (Églises) exercising no political power.” PAUL
ROBERT, 5 LE GRAND ROBERT DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE 915 (2d ed. 1992). Laïcité certainly
evokes the concepts of secularism and separation of religion and the state, but, like the term
“democracy,” it can have widely different meanings and applications in both polemical debates
and legal texts. Laïcité has had constitutional status in France since 1946: “France is a Republic
that is indivisible, laïc, democratic, and social. France assures the equality before the law of all
its citizens without any distinction based on origin, race, or religion. It respects all beliefs.”
CONST. art. 2 (1958) (Fr.). Laïc first appeared as a constitutional term in 1946. CONST. art. 1
(1946) (Fr.).
Without attempting to provide a comprehensive definition, laïcité should be understood
as a term that was coined during the first decade of the Third Republic (1870–1940) to
identify a particular understanding of the proper relationship between church and state. The
Littré dictionary identifies the first published use of the term as occurring in 1871. 4
DICTIONNAIRE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE 1392 (Émile Littré ed., 1967). The term first
appeared in the Littré supplement of 1877, but it was defined there only as something that has
a laïc character. Laïc or laïque, are words originally used in medieval French to identify
monastic orders whose members were not ordained to the clergy, thus corresponding to the
English sense of “secular” or “lay” in their original English meanings. Thus, a “lay brother” is
a monk who does not hold clerical office. As first used, therefore, laïc referred to those whose
lives were inside the Catholic Church and devoted to the church—though they did not hold
the priesthood.
During the French Revolution, before the term laïcité was invented, much of the French
Left had developed strong anticlerical attitudes toward the Catholic clergy. The simmering
anticlerical attitudes from the revolutionary period reemerged in full force among the
dominant political class from 1879 and continued through much of the first decade of the
twentieth century. Between 1879 and 1905, several important French laws that affected the
relationship between church and state were enacted, and some, albeit in amended form,
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with a very different meaning, is “religious freedom.” These two
concepts, at first glance, would seem to suggest profoundly different
attitudes regarding the proper relationship between religion and the
state. Whereas laïcité might imply suspicion (or perhaps even
hostility) toward religion, religious freedom suggests that the state
wishes to embrace religion fully, possibly to the exclusion of
agnosticism and atheism. Public opinion surveys would seem to
support such a contrast between a relatively unreligious France and a
very religious United States.3
Despite the significant differences in the meanings of laïcité and
religious freedom, the two terms are often described in effusive
continue in force in the twenty-first century. These laws, particularly those on education (1882
and 1886), association (1901), and separation of church and state (1905), are understood to
be among the founding documents of laïcité and the modern French state. Though these laws
were extremely controversial when enacted, they are now described in almost reverential terms.
Because of the controversial origins of these laws and their association with the doctrine of
laïcité, for many French citizens the word evokes anticlericalism, anti-Catholicism, and
sometimes blatantly antireligious sentiments. As early as 1880, some began to assert that the
word “laïc” was actually a synonym for “irreligious.” See MONA OZOUF, L’ÉCOLE, L’ÉGLISE
ET LA RÉPUBLIQUE, 1871–1914 (1963). For others, the antireligious connotations are much
less pronounced, and they might use the term solely to suggest the distinctively French
approach to the separation of religion and state. Whereas “religious freedom” in the United
States typically bears the nuance of freedom of religion from the state, in France laïcité often
bears the connotation of the state protecting citizens from the excesses of religion. The
etymological irony of the evolution of laïc from referring to those whose lives were completely
devoted to the Church, to meaning (in at least one modern sense of it) “anti-Church,” has
been noted. Claude Langlois, Catholiques et laïcs, in 3.3 LES LIEUX DE MEMOIRE 146 (Pierre
Nora ed., 1992). Though only a pale reflection of the French evolution of laïc, the English
“secular” has similarly evolved from referring exclusively to nonordained monks to also
meaning “nonreligious.”
Hundreds of books and articles have been published in France on laïcité. Of the many
important writers, professors Jean Baubérot and Emile Poulat are among the most widely
cited. See, e.g., JEAN BAUBEROT, HISTOIRE DE LA LAÏCITE FRANÇAISE (2000); JEAN
BAUBEROT, LA LAÏCITE, EVOLUTIONS ET ENJEUX (1996); EMILE POULAT, LIBERTE, LAÏCITE:
LA GUERRE DES DEUX FRANCE ET LE PRINCIPE DE LA MODERNITE (1987); NOTRE LAÏCITE,
supra. For short, though somewhat dated, works in English that explain the historical
background, see JOHN MCMANNERS, CHURCH AND STATE IN FRANCE, 1870–1914 (1972)
[hereinafter CHURCH AND STATE]; JOHN MCMANNERS, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE
CHURCH (1969) [hereinafter FRENCH REVOLUTION]. For further discussion of the meaning
of laïcité, see infra text accompanying notes 24–30.
3. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project:
Americans and Europeans differ over foreign policy and other issues, but those
disagreements pale in comparison with the transatlantic gulf over religion and
morality. While 58% of Americans say that belief in God is a prerequisite to personal
morality, just a third of Germans and even fewer Italians, British and French agree.
PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, VIEWS OF A CHANGING WORLD 115 (2003), http://
people-press.org/reports/pdf/185.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2004).
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language as founding principles of the republics, as unifying
principles that bring citizens together, and as exemplifications of the
admirable characteristics that make the nations role models for the
rest of the world. In both countries, the doctrines are described as
being fully consistent with the constitutional norms of equality,
neutrality, and tolerance. But despite the popular beliefs that laïcité
and religious freedom are founding principles that unite the citizens
of their respective countries, they actually operate in ways that are
more akin to founding myths. If we probe their historical
backgrounds, it becomes clear that neither doctrine originated as a
unifying or founding principle. Rather, each emerged during periods
of confrontation, of intolerance, and often of violence against those
who held dissenting beliefs. Moreover, in current controversies
involving religion and the state, where the doctrines are cited for the
ostensible purpose of resolving conflicts, they continue to be applied
in ways that divide citizens on the basis of their beliefs and that
belittle those whose beliefs do not conform to popular preferences.
Thus, the doctrines of laïcité and religious freedom are frequently
employed not in the idealized way that the myths might imagine,
but in the confrontational and polemical ways in which they
originally developed.
Two contemporary controversies involving religious expression
in public schools illustrate how the doctrines of laïcité and religious
freedom are applied in both their mythic and confrontational
manners. In March 2004, France adopted a new law prohibiting
children in public schools from wearing clothing and insignia that
“conspicuously manifest a religious affiliation.”4 The law, which was
designed to prohibit students from wearing Islamic headscarves,
Jewish skullcaps, and large crosses, was sponsored by the ruling
conservative party, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), and
was endorsed by the opposing Socialist Party.5 The law was approved
by an overwhelming vote of 494 to 36 in the National Assembly,
and by a comparably disproportionate vote of 276 to 20 in the
Senate, and was strongly supported by popular opinion throughout
France.6
4. Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, J.O., Mar. 17, 2004, at 5190 [hereinafter
Law No. 2004-228].
5. See infra discussion accompanying notes 166–82.
6. According to a public opinion survey in late 2003, 72% of the French population
supported a law that would ban all signs of religious and political adherence in public schools,
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Two years earlier, on the opposite side of the Atlantic, a divided
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled in Newdow v. U.S. Congress (“Newdow I”), that the words
“under God” in the American Pledge of Allegiance (the “Pledge”)
violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.7 The decision
provoked an immediate public outcry.8 On June 26, 2003, within
hours of the release of the Newdow I opinion, the Senate voted
ninety-nine to zero to reaffirm the language of the Pledge.9 The
following day, the House of Representatives adopted a similar

as against 23% who opposed it (with 5% undecided). Moreover, 56% of the population would
support a similar ban being imposed on private religious schools as well. When broken down
by political viewpoint, the Right supports the public school ban by a slightly higher percentage
than the Left (79% to 71%), and their beliefs are also felt with greater intensity than are those
of the political Left. Le Sondage BVA/Profession Politique/LCP-AN en tableaux de
pourcentages, LE BLEU, Nov. 18, 2003, http://www.laic.info/Members/webmestre/
Societe.2003-11-20.2408/view (last visited Apr. 21, 2004). For an early and perceptive
French analysis of the 2004 legislation, see ALAIN GARAY & EMMANUEL TAWIL, Tumulte
autour de la laïcité, 7145 RECUEIL DALLOZ 225 (2004).
7. 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Newdow I]. The Ninth Circuit
panel reversed the lower court and held, by a 2–1 decision, that the words “under God” in the
Pledge of Allegiance, as well as the California requirement that teachers lead students in the
Pledge, both violate the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause provides that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. I. This original panel decision, Newdow I, was subsequently revised and amended to
eliminate the holding that the words “under God” in the federal statute are unconstitutional,
and held only that the California statutory requirement for teachers to lead the Pledge remains
unconstitutional. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d at 482–93 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter
Newdow II], cert. granted sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384
(2003). The Ninth Circuit denied a rehearing en banc. Id. at 468–82 [hereinafter Newdow
III]. (The amended decision and the opinions regarding the rehearing en banc were published
together.) The Pledge of Allegiance is currently codified in the U.S. Code.
“I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the
Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all[],” should be rendered by standing at attention facing the flag with the
right hand over the heart. When not in uniform men should remove any religious
headdress with their right hand and hold it at the left shoulder, the hand being over
the heart. Persons in uniform should remain silent, face the flag, and render the
military salute.
4 U.S.C. § 4 (2004).
The Pledge of Allegiance, without the expression “under God,” was first codified in
federal law in 1942. 36 U.S.C. § 1972 (1942). The words “under God” were added in the Act
of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 396, ch. 297, 68 Stat. 249. See infra text accompanying notes
44, 87, 296–311.
8. See, e.g., Tom Vanden Brook, Critics Say Court Was “California Dreaming,” USA
TODAY, June 27, 2002, at A04; Evelyn Nieves, Judges Ban Pledge of Allegiance from Schools,
Citing “Under God,” N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at A20.
9. S. Res. 292, 107th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
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resolution reaffirming the Pledge by a vote of 416 to 3.10
Immediately after voting, one hundred members of Congress
gathered to have their photographs taken on the front steps of the
Capitol building while they held their hands over their hearts and
recited the Pledge.11 Apparently believing that the resolutions were
insufficient, a few months later the Senate and House enacted a new
federal statute “[t]o reaffirm the reference to one Nation under God
in the Pledge of Allegiance.”12 Showing no less patriotic zeal, the
following sessions of the House and Senate adopted additional
resolutions supporting the Pledge, again by lopsided majorities.13
American public opinion surveys suggest Americans who were aware
of the controversy were strongly opposed to the Ninth Circuit
decision and firmly supported the continuation of the Pledge.14
The overwhelming legislative votes on religious clothing in
France and the Pledge of Allegiance in the United States initially
suggest a striking difference between the two countries. In France,
schoolchildren are prohibited from engaging in religious expression
in their choice of clothing, while in the United States, Congress has
insisted that religious language designed to be recited in public
schools throughout the country remain in the Pledge. Thus, France
seems to prohibit religious expression while the United States
promotes it. On the other hand, there are curious similarities in the
two countries’ approaches. In both cases the national legislatures
relied on their respective doctrines of laïcité and religious freedom to
decide that the state should be responsible for determining which
forms of religious expression should (or should not) be permitted in
public schools and imposed it in a way that not only corresponded to
popular preferences, but showed contempt for those who believed
that the legislative actions violated the constitutional values of

10. H.R. Res. 459, 107th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
11. Whether knowingly or not, those gathering to have their pictures taken reciting the
Pledge were copying the action of the original sponsors of the “under God” amendment in
1954, see supra note 7, who recited the Pledge while standing in front of CBS television
cameras. See infra text accompanying note 311.
12. Act of Nov. 13, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-293, 116 Stat. 2057 (amending 4 U.S.C. §
4 in order to “reaffirm[] the exact language that has appeared in the Pledge for decades”).
13. S. Res. 71, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted); H.R. Res. 132, 108th Cong. (2003)
(enacted).
14. FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2003, at 19
(2003), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/SOFA.2003.pdf (last visited Apr. 21,
2004).
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equality and neutrality. France is suspicious of the true believer. The
United States is suspicious of the non-believer.
But before considering their differences more fully, we should
note some underlying similarities between the two countries. Among
modern nations, France and the United States have two of the
longest traditions of operating under written constitutions. The
United States has the oldest such extant written Constitution in the
world.15 France’s first constitution dates to 1791, long before most
other European countries.16 Their current constitutions incorporate
the world’s two oldest human rights texts, both written in 1789, that
are in effect today: the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizen and the American Bill of Rights.17 Their common
assumption—that human beings have inherent rights—has now been
adopted (if not always respected) in almost all written constitutions
in the world as well as in all of the basic international human rights
instruments. French and Americans take pride in their human rights
records and believe that they are models for the rest of the world.18
The highest courts of both countries have held that their respective
15. For the history of constitutions generally, see CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE
HISTORY (Albert P. Blaustein & Jay A. Sigler eds., 1988).
16. Id. at 70. The first modern constitution was that of the United States, followed by
Poland (1791) and France (1791). Depending on how one defines “constitution,” France may
be said to have had more than a dozen constitutions since that of 1791. Its current
constitution dates from 1958.
17. The documents were written within only a few weeks of each other in the latter part
of 1789. While the French may claim chronological priority in both drafting and promulgating
its declaration, Americans may claim greater continuity with the Bill of Rights. The American
Bill of Rights was ratified effective December 15, 1791. The French Declaration of the Rights
of Man, unlike the American Bill of Rights, has not been in continuous existence since it was
drafted. It has, however, been incorporated by the preamble of the French Constitution of
1958. CONST. pmbl. (1958) (Fr.). For further discussion of the Declaration, see infra note
213.
18. For example, President George W. Bush declared that “repressed people around the
world must know this about the United States: . . . we will always be the world’s leader in
support of human rights.” George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Recognition of Cuba
Independence Day (May 18, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/
20010518-7.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). He also takes personal credit for promoting
human rights: “No President has ever done more for human rights than I have.” Ken Auletta,
Fortress Bush, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 19, 2004, at 64 (quoting President George W. Bush)
(internal quotes omitted).
In a widely publicized speech on laïcité, President Chirac made similar claims about
France. “Everywhere in the world France is recognized as the country of human rights.”
Jaques Chirac, Speech from the Elysée Palace (Dec. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Chirac, Elysée
Palace Speech], http://www.elysee.fr/magazine/actualite/sommaire.php?doc=/documents/
discours/2003/D031217.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
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constitutions require state neutrality with regard to religion and nonreligion and that equality is a governing norm on matters of religion
and law.19
This Article will compare the French doctrine of laïcité and the
American doctrine of religious freedom at three different levels, but
without analyzing their constitutionality per se.20 Part II will compare
the rhetoric in which the two doctrines are commonly described.
Part III compares the historical backgrounds in which the two
doctrines emerged. Finally, the last two parts of the Article will
examine how the doctrines have been applied to contemporary issues
relating to religious expression in public schools. Part IV first
examines the political and social events in France leading to the
adoption of the religious clothing ban, followed by an analysis of a
report issued by the presidentially appointed Stasi Commission,
which made the recommendation that ultimately led to the adoption
of the law. 21 Part V turns to the United States, where it first
examines the historical background of the adoption of the Pledge of
Allegiance, followed by an analysis of the dissenting opinions in the
Newdow case, which argued that the phrase “under God” is
constitutionally permissible. The opinions of the dissenting judges in
Newdow II and Newdow III appear to conform to the attitudes of
Congress and the American public, as seen through the mythic
version of religious freedom.
Because founding myths can be deeply embedded in popular
consciousness and political rhetoric, it may be difficult for the
19. In the case of France, see Avis du Conseil d’État no. 346893 (Nov. 27, 1989),
reprinted in BERNARD JEUFFROY & FRANÇOIS TRICARD, LIBERTE RELIGIEUSE ET REGIMES
DES CULTES EN DROIT FRANÇAIS 1031–34 (1996). In the case of the United States, see, for
example, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534
(1993) (holding that the Establishment Clause “forbids subtle departures from neutrality”
(internal quotes omitted) (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)));
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (religion
clauses of the First Amendment “today . . . are recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and
equality” (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985))).
20. This Article does not attempt to make the argument that current constitutional law
in France requires the French state to allow (within limits) children in public schools to wear
religious attire, nor that the U.S. Constitution prohibits Congress from drafting a pledge for
citizens that declares that America is a “Nation under God.” Although the author has opinions
on these two issues, the purpose here is limited to showing that in the two countries the legal
and constitutional issues often become entangled in the founding myths leading officials to see
neutrality, equality, and unity where they are not present.
21. For further discussion of the Stasi Commission, see infra text accompanying note
177.
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citizens of the two nations to recognize that their respective
doctrines of laïcité and religious freedom actually operate as myths.
However, it is not difficult for people who are not immersed in such
myths to recognize their weaknesses. Americans would likely have no
difficulty observing the flaws in the French approach that led to the
banning of religious clothing,22 just as the French would likely have
no difficulty seeing problems in the American wish to have “under
God” recited by children in schools.23 We can imagine that the
French and the Americans could easily recognize the actions on the
opposite side of the Atlantic—the banning of religious clothing or
the promoting of state-sponsored declarations about God—as
violating the principles of equality, neutrality, tolerance, freedom of
conscience, and human rights that their own nations scrupulously
respect. Perhaps in seeing the similarities with each other—in
rhetoric, history, and application—they will begin to recognize their
own weaknesses.

22. The French decision to ban headscarves in schools was widely reported in the
American media in late 2003, and American officials and the media expressed their concern
that prohibiting religious attire in public schools would infringe on rights of freedom of
religion. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, In France, Scarves and Secularism, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2003,
at A21; John V. Hanford, III (Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom),
Release of the 2003 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (Dec. 18, 2003), at
http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2003/Dec/22-224652.html (last visited April 20,
2004). An article in Le Monde suggested the possibility that American displeasure at the new
Chirac proposal might lead to another round of tensions between the two countries on
religious issues. Henri Tincq, A Washington, la loi française sur le voile à l’ecole est une “source
importante de préoccupation,” LE MONDE, Dec. 20, 2003, LEXIS.
23. The coverage of the American Pledge controversy in the French media treated the
American plaintiff as if he were a quixotic ingénu who was valiantly but futilely challenging the
entire American politico-religious establishment. See, e.g., L’Homme du jour: Michael Newdow,
L’HUMANITÉ, Jun. 29, 2002, http://www/humanite.presse.fr/jounal/2002-06-29/200206-29-36385 (last visited Mar. 11, 2004); “One Nation under God”: Le Serment d’allégeance
examine par la Cour supreme—AFP, at http://www.laic.info/Members/webmestre/
La_laicite_dans_le_monde.2003-10-14.0231/view (last visited Mar. 11, 2003). Following
Ambassador Hanford’s comments on headscarves in France, supra note 22, on headscarves in
France, an unnamed French diplomat told the New York Times that “[v]ery often there are
debates on the pledge of allegiance or other religious issues in the schools,” and then insisted,
“Never have you heard a French diplomat comment on an internal debate in the United
States.” Christopher Marquis, U.S. Chides France on Effort to Bar Religious Garb in Schools,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003, at A8.
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II. NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND FOUNDING MYTHS:
LAÏCITÉ IN THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Laïcité as a Founding Myth of the French Republic
Despite the lack of certainty about what laïcité actually means,
officials, politicians, scholars, and citizens are often effusive in their
praise of the term. A particularly impressive example of this appeared
in a speech in December 2003 by President Jacques Chirac, where
he first proposed that children be prevented from wearing
“conspicuous” (ostensible) religious clothing in public schools.24 The
President asserted that “laïcité is inscribed in our traditions. It is at
the heart of our republican identity.”25 It is a principle to which
citizens should be faithful: “It is in fidelity to the principle of laïcité,
the cornerstone of the Republic, the bundle of our common values
of respect, tolerance, and dialogue, to which I call all of the French
to rally.”26 Laïcité is a “pillar” of the French Constitution: “Its values
are at the core of our uniqueness as a Nation. These values spread
our voice far and wide in the world. These are the values that create
France.”27 It is a doctrine that protects the basic rights of belief:
“Laïcité guarantees freedom of conscience. It protects the freedom
to believe or not to believe. It assures everyone of the possibility to
express and practice their faith peaceably, freely, though without
threatening others with one’s own convictions or beliefs.”28 France is
a land of diversity in which laïcité promotes tolerance.29 Laïcité is
“one of the great accomplishments of the Republic. It is a crucial
element of social peace and national cohesion. We can never permit
it to weaken!”30 Thus, laïcité is a foundational value, at the core of
French uniqueness, and an inspiring model for the entire world.
24. Chirac, Elysée Palace Speech, supra note 18.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. “As a land of ideas and principles, France is open, welcoming, and generous . . . .
[The] French people are rich in their diversity. It is a diversity we have willingly accepted and
which is at the heart of our identity.” Id. “We all speak of the values of tolerance and of respect
for the other [and] of the diversity which has created the grandeur of France.” Id.
30. Id. In another speech, President Chirac said, “Laïcité is a value of extraordinary
modernity that expresses the spirit of tolerance, of respect and of dialogue that must now,
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President Chirac is not alone in using such words of praise.
Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin observed that “Laïcité is a
cardinal value that precisely permits each person to express his or her
convictions in freedom, security, and tolerance. Laïcité is our
common approach. Laïcité allows France to be a land of tolerance.
Laïcité prevents France from pitting [religious and ethnic]
communities against each other.”31 In a speech to the Freemasons in
2003, the Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy (the French
Interior Ministry is responsible for religious and police issues),
asserted that “[l]aïcité is not a belief like others. It is our shared
belief that allows others to live with respect for the public order and
with respect for the convictions of everyone.”32 It is not only
politicians who hold such beliefs. Jean Gaeremynck, a conseiller
d’État (counselor of state), praises it in words that might more
appropriately be used to describe an expensive perfume rather than a
legal doctrine: “the French style of laïcité, in its originality, its
subtlety, its finesse, and richness . . . .”33 These descriptions of laïcité
are words of homage, praise, admiration—perhaps even love.34 They
are the effusive but imprecise words that an amateur poet might use
to describe his beloved. While he tells us that he adores her precious
eyes, enchanting smile, and silky hair, the description is sufficiently
vague that we would be unable to identify her in a crowd. This is the
point of national myths and symbols: they are the receptacles that
allow people to project onto them their idealized images of their
values, cultures, histories, peoples, and lands.35 In France one’s
particular understanding of laïcité is tied to one’s sense of identity.36

more than ever, prevail. It is a principle that we must not transgress . . . .” Jacques Chirac
défend le principe de laïcité, LE MONDE, May 5, 2003, LEXIS.
31. Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Speech to the CRIF (Jan. 25, 2003), http://www.premierministre.gouv.fr/fr/p.cfm?ref=38100 (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
32. Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech to the Freemasons (Jun. 24, 2003), http://www.godf.
org/discours_275_minint.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
33. Jean Gaeremynck, La Laïcité dans la loi, 113-114 HOMMES ET LIBERTES, Mar.–Jun.
2001, at 33, 33.
34. Madeleine Rebérioux speaks of “the love the French have for the law [of 1905 on
the separation of churches and the state].” Madeleine Rebérioux, La Longue genèse de la laïcité,
113-114 HOMMES ET LIBERTES, Mar.–Jun. 2001, at 26, 32.
35. Although words such as these are widely repeated and embraced in France, serious
scholars and jurists fully understand that the encomiums to laïcité ultimately must be translated
into legal principles. Mature French scholars and jurists, of course, have no difficulty
differentiating between the myth of laïcité and the historical concept of laïcité. One thinks
particularly of JACQUES ROBERT & JEAN DUFFAR, DROITS DE L’HOMME ET LIBERTÉS
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B. Religious Freedom as an American Founding Myth
While Americans might be amused to hear the inherently vague
doctrine of laïcité being described in such glowing tones, particularly
when it is characterized as a cornerstone of the French Republic,
they should perhaps first consider the rhetoric emanating from their
own country. In terms of the constitutional language itself, the terms
“free exercise of religion” and “establishment of religion” are not
inherently more revealing than laïcité.37 But this does not prevent
officials from praising religious freedom in words similar to those
used by the French to describe laïcité. In January 2002, for example,
President George W. Bush said: “Religious freedom is a cornerstone
of our Republic, a core principle of our Constitution, and a
fundamental human right. Many of those who first settled in
America, such as the Pilgrims, came for the freedom of worship and
belief that this new land promised.”38 Such effusive language comes
from a president who emphasizes the role of religion in his own
personal life. Before he was elected, the U.S. Congress had already
enacted—unanimously—the International Religious Freedom Act of
1998. The introduction to that law states:
The right to freedom of religion undergirds the very origin and
existence of the United States. Many of our Nation’s founders fled
religious persecution abroad, cherishing in their hearts and minds
the ideal of religious freedom. They established in law, as a
fundamental right and as a pillar of our Nation, the right to
freedom of religion. From its birth to this day, the United States
has prized this legacy of religious freedom . . . . 39

FONDAMENTALES 564–67 (6th ed. 1996) (speaking of “a new laïcité” and “a renewed legal
idea” and “a new laic pact”). The most impressive effort to date to analyze systematically
French law on religion, both historically and jurisprudentially, is TRAITÉ DE DROIT FRANÇAIS
DES RELIGIONS (Francis Messner et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter MESSNER].
36. NOTRE LAÏCITE, supra note 2, at 21.
37. Religious freedom is a constitutional value in the United States, whose textual basis
is located principally in the First Amendment to the Constitution, but emerges in other
constitutional provisions as well, particularly in Article VI and the Fourteenth Amendment. For
a detailed study describing the lack of any specific meaning of the term “establishment of
religion” in eighteenth-century America, see T. JEREMY GUNN, A STANDARD FOR REPAIR: THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, EQUALITY, AND NATURAL RIGHTS 69–96 (1992).
38. George W. Bush, President Proclaims Religious Freedom Day, 2002 (Jan. 16, 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020116.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2004).
39. 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (2004).
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The U.S. State Department, in an explanation of why it seeks to
promote religious freedom internationally, stated:
[T]he quest for religious liberty has played an integral part in
American history. Early in our nation’s founding, the view that
every human being has a fundamental right to believe, worship and
practice according to his or her own conscience became a core
conviction of the American people. Religious liberty is the first of
the enumerated rights in our Constitution, and is known as “the
first freedom,” because the founders believed it to be a lynchpin of
democracy and the other fundamental human rights.40

The language that characterizes freedom of religion as “the first
freedom” is made by those on both the political Right and the
Left.41 And the belief in America as a country founded on religious
beliefs also has covered the political spectrum. One of the most
liberal justices in the history of the Supreme Court, William O.
Douglas, wrote famously that “[w]e are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”42 Former President
George H.W. Bush, father of President George W. Bush, said when
he was in office, “more than 90 percent [of Americans] believe in
God, to which I say, thank God. I wish it were 100 percent.”43
40. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002: INTRODUCTION (2002) [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT], http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13607.htm (last visited Mar.
11, 2004).
41. THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); NAT HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM
(1980); JAMES E. WOOD, JR., THE FIRST FREEDOM: RELIGION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1990). President George W. Bush proclaimed January 15, 2003, to be “religious freedom
day,” in honor of the anniversary of the adoption of the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom.
In his proclamation commemorating that event, he said that “[b]ecause the Framers placed the
guarantee of religious freedom before other cherished rights, religious liberty in America is
often called the first freedom.” George W. Bush, Religious Freedom Day, 2003 (Jan. 15, 2003),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/ 20030115-11.html (last visited Mar.
11, 2004).
42. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
43. George Bush, Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Religious
Broadcasters (Jan. 27, 1992), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/site/docs/pppus.php?
admin=041&year=1992&id=012700 (last visited Mar. 11, 2004); see also George Bush,
Remarks at a Prayer Breakfast in Houston (Aug. 20, 1992), http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/site/docs/pppus.php?admin=041&year=1992&id=082000 (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
But anyway, as we meet today, deep in the heart of Texas, we meet deep in the
heart of the most religious nation on Earth, too. I’m usually not much for polls, but
here’s a Gallup poll that makes sense to me. According to this survey, 7 in 10
Americans believe in life after death; 8 in 10, that God works miracles; 9 in 10 pray;
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When Congress amended the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954 so that it
would read “one Nation under God,” the Senate and House Reports
made reference to the constant invocations to God throughout
American history—by the Puritans, the founders, Lincoln, and
others.44 The House Report cited as precedents the Mayflower
Compact of 1620, the Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg
Address, and the federal statute to place “In God We Trust” on
coins.45
III. CORRECTIONS OF ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE
HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF LAÏCITÉ AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The notions of religious freedom as a cornerstone of American
history and as a value uniting and defining America are deeply felt
and inspiring for most Americans—just as is laïcité in France.
Although the rhetoric of laïcité and religious freedom is part of the
self-congratulatory public discourse in both the United States and
France, the underlying historical facts are not obscure.
A. The Historical Roots of Laïcité
The modern French conception of laïcité developed principally
during two periods of French history: first, the five years following
the Revolution of 1789, and second, the years 1879 to 1905 (during

and more than 90 percent believe in God. To which I say, thank God for the United
States of America. . . .
....
. . . [Y]ou cannot be President without believing in God. We say our prayers
every night. When we sit in that historic family dining room on the second floor of
the White House, we say the blessing before our meals. Today I ask for your
prayers, not for the campaign that we’re in but prayers asking God to give those of
us in leadership positions and give me as President the strength to do what is right,
the courage to lead this, the greatest nation on the face of the Earth, the United
States of America, one Nation under God.
Id.
44. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1693 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N 2339; S. REP.
NO. 83-1287 (1954), reprinted in 100 CONG. REC. 6348.
45. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1693, at 2340–41. This report inaccurately states that
Congress enacted a law on April 22, 1864, “directing” the placement of “In God We Trust”
on U.S. coins. The law simply gave the Director of the Mint the authority to specify the
“shape, mottoes, and devices” of certain coins—nothing was said about “In God We Trust.”
See An Act in Amendment of an Act entitled “An Act relating to Foreign Coins and the
Coinage of Cents at the Mint of the United States,” 38th Cong., ch. 66 (1st Sess. 1864).
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the Third Republic).46 Without discussing these two periods in
detail, it is useful to be reminded that, during these formative
periods, laïcité did not embody the high principles of tolerance,
neutrality, and equality; rather, it emerged from periods of conflict
and hostility, most of which targeted the Roman Catholic Church.47
The events described below were important steps in the formulation
of the modern understanding of laïcité. It should be understood,
however, that the circumstances and rationales underlying the
actions and events were very complicated. Here they are offered not
as criticisms of the Revolution or the Third Republic per se, but for
the specific purpose of illustrating that laïcité did not arise as a
unifying value shared by the French nation; rather, it grew out of
periods that were filled with antagonism, conflict, and prejudice, as
the following events illustrate.48
1. The first wave: the French Revolution
On November 2, 1789, three months after the storming of the
Bastille, the Constituent Assembly declared that Catholic Church
property would henceforth be at the disposal of the nation.49 During
the following months, additional decrees and orders were issued that

46. For the initial introduction to the term laïcité, see supra note 2. While these may be
identified as the two critical periods, the modern notion of laïcité, of course, has roots in
Gallicanism and the Enlightenment. It evolved between the Revolution and the Third
Republic, and it has continued to change since that time. For more complete studies, see supra
note 2.
47. Serious scholars, unlike the proponents of myths, have no difficulty recognizing that
the modern understandings of laïcité emerged from conflict. See, e.g., NOTRE LAÏCITÉ, supra
note 2, passim.
48. For studies of the revolutionary period, see A CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 20–32, 449–56, 511–18 (François Furet & Mona Ozouf eds., Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 1989); NIGEL ASTON, RELIGION AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, 1780–
1804 (2000); WILLIAM DOYLE, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
(1989); FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 2; FRANÇOIS FURET, REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE,
1770–1880 (Antonia Nevill trans., 1992); PATRICE HIGONNET, GOODNESS BEYOND VIRTUE:
JACOBINS DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1998); LES CONGRÉGATIONS HORS LA LOI?
(Jacqueline Lalouette & Jean-Pierre Machelon eds., 2002); SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A
CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1989); TIMOTHY TACKETT, RELIGION,
REVOLUTION AND REGIONAL CULTURE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE: THE
ECCLESIASTICAL OATH OF 1791 (1985); MICHEL VOVELLE, THE REVOLUTION AGAINST THE
CHURCH (Alan José trans., 1991). For a brief legal discussion of the historical events, see
MESSNER, supra note 35, at 87–89. The historical portions of the Messner book were under
the responsibility of Professor Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet.
49. FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 27; SCHAMA, supra note 48, at 483–85.
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led to the seizure and sale of a significant amount of former church
property, in many cases enriching shrewd farmers, merchants, and
nobles who were fortunate enough to obtain title to the lands and
buildings.50
On February 13, 1790, the Constituent Assembly issued the
Treilhard Decree, which dissolved all existing monastic vows,
ordered those living under such vows to disperse, forbade any future
religious vows, and dissolved all religious congregations with the
proviso that they would never be able to reconstitute themselves.51
On July 12, 1790, the Constituent Assembly adopted the Civil
Constitution of the Clergy.52 As ultimately implemented, the Civil
Constitution completely reorganized the internal structure of
Catholic dioceses in France, dismissed almost fifty bishops, and
appointed others without consulting the pope. It severed all relations
with foreign religious institutions, which necessarily included the
pope. In the future, members of the clergy were to be elected by
popular vote. Church offices were reorganized and titles were
eliminated or renamed to bring about uniformity. The new bishops
were required to take an oath of loyalty to the state and their salaries
were then to be paid by the state. In form, the oath was to be taken
with the same straight-arm gesture that had been popularized earlier
in the decade in imitation of the ancient Roman oath of loyalty.53
50. At the time that church property was declared to be at the disposition of the nation,
the law was not seen as particularly controversial.
51. 46 LE MONITEUR UNIVERSEL 184 (Feb. 15, 1790), reprinted in JEUFFROY &
TRICARD, supra note 19, at 964 (citing only part of the decree); NOTRE LAÏCITÉ, supra note
2, at 51. Similar decrees were issued on September 3, 1791, August 4, 1792, and August 18,
1792. Id. One problem for historians of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France is
identifying and tracing the many laws, decrees, and edicts that purported to dissolve
congregations. The frequency with which such edicts were issued says something important
about the inability of officials to implement them fully and the ability of the congregations to
operate despite adversity.
52. 194 LE MONITEUR UNIVERSEL 797–98 (July 13, 1790). For discussions of the
Civil Constitution of the Clergy, see FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 38–67; NOTRE
LAÏCITÉ, supra note 2, at 54–57.
53. The official salute for the oath during the Revolution was made with an
outstretched straight-arm gesture, with the palm facing down. SCHAMA, supra note 48, at 174.
This gesture, which was believed to have been the gesture used by the ancient Romans, was
made famous in modern France by the painter Jacques-Louis David in his 1784 painting the
Oath of the Horatii. The painting depicts the three Horatii brothers with outstretched arms
swearing an oath of loyalty to the incipient Roman republic. In his study of the work, Professor
Rosenblum was unable to find any classical sources for the Horatii having taken such an oath.
ROBERT ROSENBLUM, TRANSFORMATIONS IN LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ART 68–69
(1974). The painting’s style and gesture created a sensation when it was first exhibited in Paris
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From the time it began to be implemented, it could be said that
there were two Catholic Churches, one that was “constitutional”
and consisted of those who had pled allegiance to the state, and the
other that was “resistant” or “non-juring” (réfractaire) and loyal to
Rome.54 Many (possibly most) historians of the period have judged it
to be perhaps the single biggest mistake of the period, with some
describing it in terms such as the beginning of a “holy war” or a
“civil war,” as “destructive, indeed, disastrous,” and even as revealing
an “instinct for intolerance.”55
On November 26, 1790, due to the refusal of many in the
Catholic clergy to take the oath, the Constituent Assembly adopted a
new law requiring all clergy to take an oath of loyalty to the state
within one week, failing which they were to be replaced
immediately.56 Following the implementation of the law, and the
issuance of orders and decrees, many of the resisting clergy either
fled France (perhaps 30,000 to 40,000), were tracked down and

in 1785. SCHAMA, supra note 48, at 172–74. Four years later, life imitated art. On June 20,
1789, when the Third Estate was barred from meeting in the Palace of Versailles, it moved to
an indoor tennis court near the palace. There, in a moment of patriotic fervor, the Third Estate
intentionally copied the straight-arm gesture depicted in the painting and swore, “to God and
the Patrie never to be separated until we have formed a solid and equitable Constitution as our
constituents have asked us to.” Id. at 359. Two years later, in September 1791, art imitated life
imitating art when David exhibited at the biennial Salon in the Louvre his detailed drawing of
the Oath of the Tennis Court, where he duly recorded the members holding their arms
outstretched, just as he had conceived it in his Horatii painting. The 1791 drawing and the
1784 painting hung next to each other in the Salon. Id. at 568–69. One hundred years later,
Americans adopted the straight-arm salute for the original Pledge of Allegiance—which
perhaps makes this a case of life imitating art imitating life imitating art. For the American
adoption of the straight-arm gesture for the first Pledge of Allegiance, see infra note 277.
54. NOTRE LAÏCITE, supra note 2, at 53.
55. SCHAMA, supra note 48, at 491. “If there was a point at which the Revolution ‘went
wrong’, it was when the Constituent Assembly imposed the oath to the Civil Constitution of
the Clergy. . . . This marked the end of national unity, and the beginning of the civil war.” For
a discussion of “civil war,” see FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 38. The Civil
Constitution “was especially destructive, indeed, disastrous. It brought out the Jacobins’
instinct of intolerance and saddled them with endless problems.” HIGONNET, supra note 48,
at 26. “The Civil Constitution of the Clergy was the patriotes’ biggest mistake.” Id. In the
judgment of François Furet, it would nevertheless be incorrect to see the enactment of the
Civil Constitution by itself as an act of hostility toward the Catholic Church or religion.
Rather, it was the taking of a step leading to devastating consequences that were not yet
apparent in July 1790. FURET, supra note 48, at 83–84; NOTRE LAÏCITÉ, supra note 2, at 54
(stating that in a few months France passed from unanimity to a Manicheanism).
56. 332 LE MONITEUR UNIVERSEL 1372 (Nov. 28, 1790). William Doyle cited this law
as the Constituent Assembly’s “most serious mistake.” See DOYLE, supra note 48, at 144.
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imprisoned, or met in secret.57 Though the pressure on the Catholic
clergy was mounting, it should not be imagined that Catholics were
only innocent victims who were being persecuted by an intolerant
state:
Catholic France was stirring ahead of its priests, mobilized by
intolerance and intrigue, alarmed by all the novelties regarding
[civil rights for] Protestants and Jews, and annoyed that the
Assembly should have refused to concede to the [Catholic] religion
a “national” status which would have allowed it to retain a sort of
privilege. The tradition of intolerance had resumed where it was
strongest, in the towns of the Midi where Catholics and Protestants
confronted one another. . . . [In Nîmes,] civil war raged for several
days, to the great detriment of the Catholic forces, who were
beaten and massacred.58

Prior to the beginning of 1791, many of the clergy had been
supporters of the Revolution and had worked to find compromises.
But the attempt to enforce the oath “turned a crisis into a
disaster.”59 A year after the first oath law was decreed, the new
Legislative Assembly enacted a measure in November 1791 requiring
all state functionaries, including the clergy, to affirm their oaths, the
failure of which would make them “suspect” in the eyes of the law.
“At the end of the summer [of 1791], the situation had hardened
everywhere.”60 A year later, on August 15, 1792, some of the
ostensible principles of the French Revolution appeared in yet
another oath that all state functionaries, including the clergy, were
required to affirm: “I swear to be faithful to the nation, to maintain
with all my power liberty [and] equality.”61 The refusal to recite
these words (which is, of course, different from the failure to live by
them) led to an “open season for ‘priest hunts’ [where] the Assembly
ordered nonjurors to quit the country within a fortnight on pains of
57. FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 106.
58. FURET, supra note 48, at 90. One of the most insightful and informed historians of
modern France, Theodore Zeldin, commented in another context how the Catholic Church—
even after the turbulence of the Revolution—was fully capable of doing unto others what had
been done to it. During Napoleon III’s rule, when the Church returned to a position of
official approval in France, “it embarked on a policy of persecution of its enemies which
destroyed most of the sympathy that liberals and republicans may have had for it.” THEODORE
ZELDIN, FRANCE 1848–1945: ANXIETY AND HYPOCRISY 262 (1981).
59. ASTON, supra note 48, at 160.
60. FURET, supra note 48, at 90.
61. 230 LE MONITEUR UNIVERSEL 966 (Aug. 17, 1792); Aston, supra note 48, at 182.
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deportation to Guiana.”62 The irony of requiring this oath has been
observed: “the paradoxical spectacle of an oath, a sacred gesture of
national unity, had become a sign of the division of the nation.”63
On September 2, 1792, in response to news of a defeat of the
French army on the Prussian front, Parisians reacted by storming
prisons (mostly former convents and monasteries seized during the
Revolution) that housed the reputed enemies of the Republic. For
almost a week, rioters engaged in a rampage of destruction and
murdered between 1,000 and 1,500 of the inmates, including many
church officials who had been incarcerated following their refusal to
take the oaths and thus effectively sentencing them to death for
being nonjurors. During the following two years, hundreds of clergy
and nuns were murdered in Paris and throughout many parts of
France, and perhaps as many as 40,000 emigrated.64
In Year II (fall 1793 to fall 1794), the Jacobin revolutionaries
began to turn their animus toward Protestants and Jews, and added
them to their growing list of enemies of the patrie.65 Year II, which
is sometimes equated with a campaign of “de-Christianization,” has
been described as having “cast a heavy shadow on the future.”66
Priceless French cultural treasures of religious architecture, sculpture,
painting, and stained glass were looted or destroyed. From the
Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris, hundreds of medieval sculptures
of prophets, priests, and kings were decapitated, ripped from their
coves, and ignominiously tossed into the Seine. The cathedral’s
thirteenth and fourteenth century stained glass windows suffered the
same shattered fate as the windows of almost every other church in
France.67 Yet even in its damaged state, the cathedral in Paris
survived. The same cannot be said for the Third Abbey Church at
Cluny, a masterpiece of Romanesque architecture and the largest
building in Europe until the sixteenth century. At its medieval peak,
Cluny was the most powerful ecclesiastical and intellectual center in

62. Alston, supra note 48, at 182.
63. Langlois, supra note 2, at 168. For the American parallel, where the Pledge of
Allegiance was used to justify abuse against “non-pledgers,” see infra text accompanying notes
282–95.
64. FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 106.
65. HIGONNET, supra note 48, at 235.
66. VOVELLE, supra note 48, at 175.
67. The windows of the cathedral at Chartres and the church Ste-Chapelle in Paris were
virtually the only survivors.
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Europe. By the time the Revolution had completed its deChristianization, the abbey was a pile of rubble. The abbey church of
Saint Denis outside Paris, whose apse was the first example of Gothic
architecture and whose stained-glass windows prompted the writing
of one of the most important medieval documents on visual
aesthetics, did not escape the rampage. As the burial church for the
kings and queens of France, Saint Denis was a prized symbolic
target. The royal tombs were ripped open and the skeletons tossed in
fields.68 By starkly polarizing church and state, the revolutionary
crowds demolished a cultural legacy of France. The scope of
destruction of the revolutionary de-Christianizers makes the
Taliban’s blasting of the Bamiyan Buddha appear to be only some
modest housekeeping by comparison.
On February 21, 1795, after the worst of the terror was over, a
new law on separation of church and state was adopted, which
affirmed the principle of free worship and declared that the state
would not subsidize any religious minister. But even with this
comparatively progressive law, the legacy of state control over
religious symbols endured. Echoing an April 1792 Constituent
Assembly “decision in principle” that priests must not wear clerical
attire in public,69 and foreshadowing the debates on headscarves in
the twenty-first century, the separation law prohibited anyone from
wearing “religious ornaments or clothing” in public.70
Although one might argue that not all of these actions targeted
the Catholic Church per se, the combination of legislative measures,
enforcement actions, and spontaneous crowd violence created “a
climate that should be characterized by its deep hostility to the
religion that was considered as being inseparable from the ancient
regime.”71 But in addition to observing the examples of hostility
during the Revolution, it also is important to note what may have
been an equally serious problem: the recurring demand that citizens
choose between their religion and the state. Nigel Aston, who does
not hide his sympathy for the Catholics of the revolutionary period,

68. ASTON, supra note 48, at 191–93; HIGONNET, supra note 48, at 235.
69. HIGONNET, supra note 48, at 235.
70. 156 LE MONITEUR UNIVERSEL 640 (Feb. 24, 1795) (or 3 ventôse, an III in the
Revolutionary calendar).
71. See MESSNER, supra note 35, at 87. It is important to identify such conflicts that
demonstrate that during its historical development laïcité was enmeshed in intolerance,
divisiveness, and conflict.
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concludes that the Assembly’s demands in 1790 and 1791 for priests
to swear oaths of primary loyalty to the state “destroyed the
revolutionary consensus of 1789.”72 The Assembly had unnecessarily
demanded “a stark choice between religion and revolution.”73 It was
as if a person could not be genuinely Catholic and genuinely
French.74
2. The second wave: the Third Republic
Between the French Revolution and the Third Republic (1870–
1940), France underwent several changes of regime. During this
period, the relations between church and state also went through
several phases. It was, however, the second decade of the Third
Republic, beginning in 1879, when the next major developments of
laïcité occurred, and by which time the term had been coined and
was being used with increasing frequency.75 Between 1880 and 1905
there were three overlapping waves of actions that, once again,

72. ASTON, supra note 48, at 161.
73. Id. at 162.
74. It would be incorrect to assume that there were no positive examples of tolerance
emerging from the revolutionary period. Interspersed with these conflicts, some relatively
liberal and pluralistic proposals were briefly adopted. Messner differentiates three separate
currents of thought regarding religion and the state in the ten years following 1789: one that
sought to secularize in a direction of pluralism, one that sought to submit the Catholic Church
to a severe Gallicanism, and a third that conducted a campaign of de-Christianization.
MESSNER, supra note 35. Some of the relatively more pluralistic laws, which are often used to
describe the more benign aspects of the Revolution, include (obviously) the Declaration of the
Rights of Man, Article I of the Constitution of 1791, and Article 7 of the Declaration of
Rights of 1793.
75. It should be noted that this brief survey of some conflicts in French society is not a
full history of laïcité. For example, three of the enduring monuments of the 1880s are the
Education Laws of 1881 (loi Ferry), 1882 (loi Ferry), and 1886 (loi Goblet). Moreover, the
Law on Associations of 1901, which was used in part to target religious congregations, also
included some provisions that are among the world’s most progressive with respect to rights of
association. Law on the Contract of Association of July 1, 1901, J.O. July 2, 1901, 4025
[hereinafter 1901 Law]. For the constitutional significance of the 1901 Law, as amended, see
the decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel, July 16, 1971, translated in JOHN BELL, FRENCH
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 272–73 (1998). For some major historical treatments of religion and
state during this period, see CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 2, at 45–63, 149–75; JEANMICHEL DUHART, LA FRANCE DANS LA TOURMENTE DES INVENTAIRES (2001); JEUFFROY &
TRICARD, supra note 19, at 410–19; MONA OZOUF, supra note 2; MALCOLM O. PARTIN,
WALDECK-ROUSSEAU, COMBES, AND THE CHURCH: THE POLITICS OF ANTI-CLERICALISM,
1899–1905 (1969).
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targeted particularly Catholic congregations in an effort to suppress
them.76
On March 29, 1880, the cabinet presided by Charles Louis de
Freycinet issued (with questionable legal authority) two decrees. The
first suppressed the Society of Jesus (Jesuits), and the second
required all “unauthorized” religious congregations to apply for legal
recognition within three months. Although the decrees were not
fully or consistently enforced, several raids were conducted
throughout the country, including eleven predawn raids on religious
houses in Paris.77 It appears that 261 houses and institutions were
closed and that between 5,000 and 10,000 monks were evicted. The
expulsions gave the Catholic press numerous examples of allegedly
pious people being evicted from their communities. Between 1880
and 1905, more than two dozen laws were promulgated that
promoted laïcité in ways ranging from placing civil disabilities on
those who had received a religious education to preventing religious
manifestations in streets during funeral processions.78 The spirit of
laïcité could act with the same intolerance that it accused others of
exemplifying.79
On July 1, 1901, France adopted its famous Law on
Associations, which, as amended, continues to form the core of
French association law.80 Articles 13 through 18 of the original law,81
which was replaced in 1942 during the Vichy regime, required all
“religious congregations” (which were not defined in the law but
were understood to include institutions such as monasteries,
convents, religious hospitals, and religious schools) to apply for
authorization, which could be granted only by a parliamentary
statute specifically approving the congregation. Any congregation
not receiving parliamentary approval would be “outside the law” and
subject to confiscation. All congregations were required to apply
within three months. During the next four years, as parliament
76. Additional measures were taken to reduce the influence of religious congregations in
public education. Such measures are not being considered here.
77. See CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 2, at 51. Because of the questionable legal
authority, many groups never complied and ultimately remained in place. See also OZOUF,
supra note 2, at 63 (“Expulsions against congregations and communities (totaling 261, which
consisted of 5,643 monks) followed shortly after the publication of the two decrees.”).
78. NOTRE LAÏCITE, supra note 2, at 88–89.
79. Id. at 25.
80. See 1901 Law, supra note 75.
81. Id.
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refused to enact laws authorizing the congregations, hundreds were
closed and several thousand monks and nuns sought exile outside of
France. During the following four years additional decrees and laws
were passed, including measures such as prohibiting any member of a
congregation from teaching in school.
On December 9, 1905, the National Assembly adopted the Law
on the Separation of Churches and the State.82 Articles 3 through 6
effectively expropriated all religious property that had been acquired
or built prior to 1905, and established procedures for state officials
to conduct inventories of the property. The French state continues
to own church buildings constructed before 1905, including all of
the famous cathedrals of France, though it pays for their
maintenance and allows the Church to use them.83 The law also
unilaterally revoked the Concordat of 1801, which had provided that
the state would pay clerical salaries in compensation for lands seized
during the Revolution.84 By seizing church property and refusing to
salary the clergy, the state effectively rendered the Church destitute.
During the following months, as state officials attempted to take
custody of church property and valuables, riots and violence broke
out in several places in France. All religious associations were
required to reregister with the state, but Catholic churches refused
to do so under the 1905 law, leaving them without a formal legal
status until after World War I.85
We may at least take comfort in the fact that the Third Republic
was less bloody than the First. Nevertheless, if laïcité was a “fruit of
French history,” as President Chirac suggested, it was bitter fruit
indeed. As Émile Poulat has observed, to think of laïcité as a
unifying agreement (pacte) among the French, is to “forget and
ignore the initial violence that was imposed in the process of
separating church and state.”86 The examples of conflict cited above
do not purport to give a full explanation of the historical
circumstances that gave rise to the modern doctrine of laïcité—and

82. Law on the Separation of Churches and the State of Dec. 9, 1905, J.O. Dec. 11,
1905, 7205. For the current version of the 1905 law, as amended, see http://www.legifrance
.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/MCEBW.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2004); see also BAUBEROT,
HISTOIRE DE LA LAÏCITE FRANÇAISE, supra note 2, at 89–91.
83. CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 2, at 152–53.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. NOTRE LAÏCITE, supra note 2, at 106.
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reasonable people may disagree about which of the measures were
necessary or appropriate given the deep and complicated issues
surrounding the wealth, power, and influence of the Catholic
Church. Nevertheless, the notion that laïcité embodies “tolerance,”
“neutrality,” and “equality” should be seen for what it is: a myth.
B. The Historical Roots of Religious Freedom
In 1966, the U.S. Congress considered an amendment to the
Constitution that would permit prayers in school. In opening a
hearing on the question, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments, Birch Bayh, said: “Our forefathers
came here not to seek religious freedom for all, as myth would have
it, but freedom to propagate their own particular kind of religion.”87
This American myth, in its simplest form, imagined that Europeans
first immigrated to America in pursuit of religious freedom and that
it subsequently became a founding and cherished principle of the
United States.88 Any serious examination of American religious
history reveals just how inaccurate this notion is.89 Among the first
laws enacted in Virginia was one that fined residents who failed to
attend Sunday service one pound of tobacco, which would be raised
to fifty pounds if they failed to attend for a month.90 The law also
provided that there shall be “uniformity in our church as neere as
may be to the canons in England” and that “all persons yeild readie
obedience unto them under paine of censure.”91 Although the
Virginia legislators’ religious sensibilities prompted them to punish
those who did not attend church and whose opinions were
unorthodox, such sensibilities did not extend so far as to censure the
87. School Prayer: Hearings on S.J.R. 148 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 2 (1966).
88. See supra Part II.B.
89. The following discussion is not a full history of religion in America. It is provided
for the limited purpose of showing that the mythical version of America as having been
founded on principles of religious freedom is unfounded. Among the major sources dealing
with the history of religion in America are: SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1975); EDWIN SCOTT GAUSTAD & LEIGH E. SCHMIDT, THE
RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF AMERICA (rev. ed. 2002); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE (2002); WILLIAM R. HUTCHISON, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN AMERICA:
THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF A FOUNDING IDEAL (2003) (identifying religious prejudice
as deriving from behavior, not theology).
90. See 1 COLONY LAWS OF VIRGINIA, 1619–1660, at 123 (John D. Cushing ed.,
1978).
91. Id. (original spelling preserved).
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practice of human slavery, which began in Jamestown as early as
1619.92
When referring to the religious beginnings of America, one of
the most frequently referenced documents is the Mayflower
Compact of 1620 and its invocation of divine favor on the new
settlers.93 But when praising the Puritans’ combination of faith in
God and the laws of the land, those who praise the Mayflower
Compact do not typically acknowledge the legal system that was
actually implemented by the Puritans. The 1648 “Lauues and
Libertyes” of Massachusetts, adopted the punishment of banishment
for Jesuits or for anyone who criticized infant baptism.94 If a Jesuit
were to return after having once been banished, “he shall be put to
death.”95 Execution was also the punishment for anyone who “shall
HAVE OR WORSHIP any other God, but the LORD GOD.”96
Other capital offenses included being a witch, a blasphemer, or a
child who cursed his parents.97 Between 1648 and 1688, five women
in the Boston area were executed for practicing witchcraft,98 and
sixteen more practitioners of witchcraft were hanged in the Salem
Common in 1692.99 Mary Dyer, a Quaker, was hanged on Boston
Common in 1660 for heresy after refusing to stop preaching that
human beings may have a direct relationship with God without
intervention of the clergy and that infant baptism was wrong.100
Three other Quakers were hanged on the Boston Common for
heresy between 1659 and 1661. Although the Puritans of
Massachusetts and the Anglicans of Virginia believed in God,

92. MARTIN E. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OWN LAND: 500 YEARS OF RELIGION IN
AMERICA 57 (1984) [hereinafter MARTY, PILGRIMS].
93. Among many examples, the two congressional reports recommending adding
“under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954 cited as precedent the Mayflower Compact
of 1620. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1693, at 2340 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N 2339; S.
REP. NO. 83-1287, at 5985 (1954), reprinted in 100 CONG. REC. 6348.
94. For more, see the facsimile edition of the 1648 LAUUES AND LIBERTYES, THE LAWS
AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS (1929). For the banishment of the Jesuits, see id. at 26.
For the banishment of those opposing infant baptism, see id. at 2.
95. Id. at 26.
96. Id. at 5.
97. Id. at 5–6.
98. RICHARD WEISMAN, WITCHCRAFT, MAGIC, AND RELIGION IN 17TH-CENTURY
MASSACHUSETTS 192–203 (1984).
99. Id. at 193–203.
100. MARTY, PILGRIMS, supra note 92, at 86–87.
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witchcraft, and slavery, they certainly did not believe in religious
freedom.
While some of the early American colonial settlements undertook
experiments with religious freedom—including, most admirably,
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania—they were the exception rather than
the rule. In 1649, Catholic Maryland adopted its famous “Act
Concerning Religion.”101 This law prohibited the molesting of all
who professed to believe in Jesus Christ, regardless of whether they
were Protestant or Catholic. Although the Act was a remarkable
statement of toleration within the seventeenth-century AmericanEuropean context, it nevertheless established the death penalty for
those who did not believe in the Trinity and also prohibited any
reproachful utterances against the Virgin, the apostles, or the
evangelists. Though most legislators supported the law as a way to
lessen religious conflict, the Puritans of Maryland opposed it because
it was too lax. When their co-religionists in England seized control
of the state during the English Civil War, the American Puritans
appealed to the mother country to suppress the law. After Cromwell
came to power in England, the Puritans of Maryland and Virginia
joined forces to oust the Catholics and revoke the act in 1654.102
Jesuit estates were plundered, all Catholic priests were forced into
exile, and four Catholics were executed.103 The Maryland experiment
in religious toleration—albeit only for Trinitarian Christians—lasted
only five years.
Virulent anti-Catholicism, apparent even in predominantly
Catholic Maryland, was pervasive in America during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. “Colonial history is full of overt and
explicit anti-Catholicism.”104 Laws discriminating against Catholics
existed throughout the colonies in the seventeenth century. “In
some cases this legislation was supported by the very Huguenots
who had fled France for their lives.”105 Even Pennsylvania, which had
long resisted pressures from England to enforce laws prohibiting
Catholics from voting or holding political office, finally succumbed
in 1705.106 Such laws against Catholic participation in political life
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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continued to exist throughout the colonies through much of the
eighteenth century.107 In 1774, the English Parliament, in an action
that combined political astuteness and religious tolerance, adopted
the Quebec Act for that newly conquered land.108 The Quebec Act
provided for religious freedom for the predominantly Catholic
population of that colony. The colonists south of Quebec did not
rejoice in celebrating the new found religious freedom for their
Catholic neighbors to the north, but bitterly denounced it. The
protests in the First Continental Congress, then meeting in
Philadelphia, were violent. “Had not the War for Independence
begun, another season of domestic intolerance would undoubtedly
have followed.”109 Although the Quebec Act provided in relevant
part only for the freedom of religion for Catholics, the Continental
Congress and provincial legislatures throughout America condemned
it for having established a tyranny.110
It is of course true that freedom of religion is the first right
identified in the Bill of Rights, but it is only rhetoric that elevates it
to being considered the “first freedom” as is often suggested. The
founding fathers certainly did not include the language about “free
exercise of religion” in the text of the original Constitution. The
Constitution of 1787 specified several other rights that have a better
chronological claim as a first freedom.111 The congressional debates
leading to the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not originally assert
that religious freedom had primacy over other rights. And the fact
that the First Amendment is now numerically the first comes not
from any stated principle about its primacy, but from the simple fact
that the first two clauses of the original proposals to amend the
Constitution were not ratified—thereby making it the first
amendment only by default.112
Even after the Constitution and Bill of Rights were ratified,
religious freedom did not manifest itself as a unifying foundational
107. Id.
108. GUNN, supra note 37, at 73–78.
109. AHLSTROM, supra note 89, at 528.
110. For examples of the vituperative colonial denunciations of the Quebec Act’s
provisions providing religious liberty to Catholics, see GUNN, supra note 37, at 75.
111. The Constitution of 1787 included general prohibitions against suspending writs of
habeas corpus, bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, direct personal taxes, religious oaths for
public office, and letters of marque and reprisal (by states). The Constitution also provided
several rights relating to the criminally accused.
112. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS 37–38 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
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principle. “Anti-Catholicism was endemic in all the Protestant settler
groups. It existed among the enlightened and reasonable founding
fathers, and among the unchurched. It was as old as 1607 and the
first settlement and as new as the newest contact.”113 Even
“enlightened” figures of the eighteenth-century American struggle
for religious liberty, such as Thomas Jefferson, engaged in antiCatholic denunciation.114 The founding father John Jay, who served
his country as Chief Justice of the United States, as governor of New
York, in legislatures, as an ambassador, and as one of the authors of
the Federalist Papers, was not above deep-seated prejudice. He
sponsored legislation to deny Catholics political rights unless they
renounced their allegiance to the pope.115
The term most frequently used by historians to identify antiCatholicism is “nativism,” which refers principally to the attitudes of
the white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants who insulted, attacked,
slandered, and legislated against Catholics, particularly those who
were recent immigrants speaking foreign languages, and whose
loyalty was questioned because of their allegiance to the pope.116 In a
new round of anti-Catholicism in the 1820s, Catholic convents and
other communities were savagely ridiculed in the pages of yellow
journalism.
Those who despised and feared these communities fantasized about
the possible sexual character of transactions that “must have” gone
on behind convent doors where celibate nuns lost their virginity to
rapacious priests. There was always a market for bestsellers like the
at-once lurid and dreary Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk, the most
notorious of the fake exposés.117

Fabricated stories about people who escaped from the clutches of
the clergy to reveal the “truth” about Catholicism were eagerly
devoured by a gullible public. In a striking parallel to some European
antisect fears in the 1980s and afterwards, the nativists captured

113. MARTIN E. MARTY, A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 107–08
(1995) [hereinafter MARTY, AMERICAN CATHOLICISM].
114. AHLSTROM, supra note 89, at 556.
115. RICHARD B. MORRIS, JOHN JAY: THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY 15 (1975).
116. AHLSTROM, supra note 89, at 556–68. We should not assume that nativists ever
constituted a majority of the American, or even Protestant, population. In the words of
William Hutchison, they were a “vigorous and noisy minority.” HUTCHISON, supra note 89,
at 48.
117. MARTY, AMERICAN CATHOLICISM, supra note 113, at 100.
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political control of Massachusetts and established a “Nunnery
Committee” to investigate the sordid goings-on behind closed
religious doors—only to learn later that there were no extant
convents in Massachusetts.118 The Nunnery Committee did not
disband itself upon learning that there were no nunneries, but
roamed the state in search of other evils to denounce.119 Even
prominent public figures, such as the inventor Samuel F.B. Morse
and the famous clergyman Lyman Beacher, engaged in their own
verbal campaigns against Catholics.120
Words sometimes led to violence. The nativists often expressed
themselves with fire, as when they burned the Ursuline convent in
Charlestown, Massachusetts, in 1834, and the houses and churches
of Catholics in Kensington (now within Philadelphia) in 1844. This
Philadelphia uprising was “the wildest and bloodiest rioting of the
entire crusade.”121 Catholic churches were burned along with Irish
homes and disorder prevailed, leading to the deaths of thirteen and
injuries to many more. Elsewhere boisterous Irish Protestant
marches led to physical attacks on Irish Catholics.122 Many
Protestants, as part of their religious education, were taught to hate
Catholics and were encouraged to build “seemingly impenetrable
walls of division between Catholics and Protestants.”123 In a vivid
description, Professor Philip Hamburger summarizes the period:
Aroused by religious prejudice, fears about political and mental
liberty, and fantasies about sexual violation, American mobs
violently attacked Catholics. In the 1830s Protestants initiated the
practice of burning down Catholic churches, their most notorious
achievement being the destruction in 1834 of the Ursuline convent
in Charlestown, Massachusetts. For decades afterward, Protestant
mobs sporadically indulged in open conflict, often stimulated by
both settled ministers and less respectable but gifted street
preachers, such as the self-proclaimed Angel Gabriel, who—dressed
in a white robe and announcing his presence with a brass horn—
118. An earlier generation of nativists had helped make this true by taking actions such as
burning of the Ursuline Convent in Charlestown. For information about the Nunnery
Committee, see HUTCHISON, supra note 89, at 50–51.
119. Id. at 50.
120. AHLSTROM, supra note 89, at 562–63.
121. Id. at 563; see also JAY P. DOLAN, IN SEARCH OF AN AMERICAN CATHOLICISM: A
HISTORY OF RELIGION AND CULTURE IN TENSION 50, 56–57 (2002).
122. DOLAN, supra note 121, at 56.
123. Id. at 57.
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incited Protestants to attack Catholics and torch their houses and
churches. In 1844, after an orchestrated campaign of anti-Catholic
preaching, Protestants in the city of brotherly love ignited churches
and battled against Catholics and local military companies,
sometimes using cannons, and causing the streets to be “baptized
in blood.”124

After a brief hiatus during the Mexican War (1846–48), antiCatholic nativism sprang back to life. In the 1840s, several political
associations were formed with patriotic names, such as the American
Republican Party, the Native American Party, and later the Order of
United Americans and the Order of the Star-Spangled Banner. The
members of these associations attempted to keep their activities
secret, and they traditionally responded that they “knew nothing”
about the various associations. They became known collectively as
the “Know Nothing Party,” though there was never an organization
with this name. The Know Nothings asserted that “Americans must
rule America” and pledged not to vote for any foreigners, which
referred specifically to U.S. citizens who were Roman Catholic.125 By
1854, the Know Nothings had become one of the most powerful
political forces in the United States, having succeeded in electing
seventy-five representatives to the U.S. Congress, and having
become a major political force in nine states.126 The anti-Catholic
interest in electoral politics did not eliminate the occasional recourse
to violence.

124. HAMBURGER, supra note 89, at 216–17. The popular acclaim that Professor
Hamburger’s book has received in some quarters reveals that it is not only politics, but also
history, that makes strange bedfellows. Individuals in the political and religious Right have
praised his detailed historical deconstruction of the “wall of separation” metaphor, which
Hamburger argues was employed by anti-Catholic crusaders in the nineteenth century. The
religious Right, which has long disdained the wall metaphor as an obstacle to reinstituting
prayers and Bibles into public schools, was pleased by his scholarly exposé of the fact that it was
religious intolerance, rather than constitutional neutrality, that gave life to the term in the
nineteenth century. It seems, however, that such supporters may have failed to grasp a deeper
significance behind all of this. They wish to throw out the wall metaphor for essentially the
same reason that their nineteenth-century coreligionists erected it: to help ensure that their
beliefs about religion would be an integral part of the public school curriculum. For an
example of this “neutral” but “non-Catholic” public-school religion advocated by Protestants,
see infra note 129. For a generous and insightful critique of Hamburger’s book, see John
Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1869 (2003).
125. DOLAN, supra note 121, at 57; HUTCHISON, supra note 89, at 48–51.
126. AHLSTROM, supra note 89, at 565; HUTCHISON, supra note 89, at 48–49.
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A decade later, in the mid-1850s, Protestants burned a dozen
churches in different towns. In Sidney, Ohio, and Dorchester,
Massachusetts, enterprising Protestants blew up churches with
gunpowder. Riots between nativists and Catholic immigrants—
often on the occasion of elections—left numerous injured and dead
in the streets and engulfed portions of American cities . . . .
Observing the mayhem in 1855, John Forney complained that
Protestant leaders sought a sort of political proscription, “hunting
down the Catholics as if they were so many wild beasts.”127

Throughout the nineteenth century, the rhetoric of the nativists
and anti-Catholics was expressed in the language of American ideals,
American values, American religion, and American patriotism. Prior
to the 1890s, the language was used to justify laws and violence
against the supposedly anti-American religions within the country.
But by the beginning of the 1890s, these religious leaders turned
their gaze beyond national boundaries. Certainly the most famous
and influential example was Josiah Strong—a congregational
minister, a member of the American Home Missionary Society, the
general secretary of the Evangelical Alliance, and a widely influential
author.128 In his book, Our Country, he identified seven perils facing
America:
immigration,
Roman
Catholicism,
Mormonism,
intemperance, socialism, wealth, and the city. Though apparently not
among the seven deadly sins, Strong also demeaned Jews, Slavs, and
Italians. When his book was revised in 1891, he added an eighth
“peril”: “religion and the public schools” (the peril being that
something other than Protestant Christianity might be taught).129
127. HAMBURGER, supra note 89, at 217 (citations omitted).
128. For a discussion of Strong’s importance, see WALTER LAFEBER, THE NEW EMPIRE
72–80 (1963). He was a “national figure” whose “goal was a Christianized world.” Id. at 73.
129. JOSIAH STRONG, OUR COUNTRY (Jurgen Herbst ed., 1963) (1891). Chapter 6, on
religion in public schools, argued that the purpose of the public school was to create
democracy. Id. at 89. Schools are “the principal digestive organ” of the body politic, and their
purpose is to absorb the “children of strange and dissimilar races” and transform them all into
“Americans.” Id. It is appropriate for public schools to teach religion, as long as it is not the
Catholic religion. “The object of the public school is to make good citizens. The object of the
parochial school is to make good Catholics.” Id. at 90. It would be much better for Catholics
to receive a public-school education rather than a parochial-school education. Id. at 93. Most
Catholics “will not object to what little religious instruction their children receive in the public
school.” Id. at 94. The public schools should thus teach Christian, but non-Catholic religion,
though it would be a serious mistake, Strong euphemistically assures us, to imagine that this
generic non-Catholic American religion should be called “Protestantism.” Id. at 95. Thus
Strong’s version of the Christian religion is presented as being “neutral” while Catholicism is
biased. This argument is a precursor to the assertion of the Ninth Circuit dissenters in

449

GUN-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/3/2004 1:32 PM

[Summer 2004

Strong could see that the United States—with “unequaled energy,”
with the world’s “highest civilization,” with the “purest” form of
Christianity, and with its “peculiarly aggressive traits”—would be
able to use its economic and military power to spread its civilizing
influence throughout the world.130
Even at the beginning of the twentieth century, state laws
institutionalized religious discrimination. In his summary of many of
the state laws of the period where legislators had attempted to
control religious minorities, Professor John Witte noted that:
[L]ocal legislatures began to clamp down on . . . dissenters. At the
turn of the twentieth century and increasingly thereafter, local
officials began routinely denying Roman Catholics their school
charters, Jehovah’s Witnesses their preaching permits, Eastern
Orthodox their canonical freedoms, Jews and Adventists their
Sabbath-day accommodations, non-Christian pacifists their
conscientious objection status. As state courts and legislatures
turned an increasingly blind eye to their plight, religious dissenters
began to turn to the federal courts for relief.131

Far from promoting any doctrine of freedom of religion, many state
laws were designed to promote the majority religion at the expense
of minorities.
Although anti-Semitism had long been a problem in the United
States, it often was less extreme than in other countries. For much of
American history, anti-Semitism expressed itself in social and political
exclusion rather than in violence. During the 1920s and 1930s,
however, coinciding with the coming to power of the Nationalist
Socialist Party in Germany, the rhetoric of anti-Semitism in the
United States became much more virulent.132 Several individuals and

Newdow, who argue that adding “under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance was a neutral act
while removing it would be tantamount to “establishing atheism.” See infra notes 343–44.
130. In Our Country, Strong asserted that the “Anglo-Saxon race” with its “unequaled
energy, with all the majesty of numbers and the might of wealth behind it—the representative,
let us hope, of the largest liberty, the purest Christianity, the highest civilization—having
developed peculiarly aggressive traits calculated to impress its institutions upon mankind, will
spread itself over the earth.” STRONG, supra note 129, quoted in SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN,
AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE: FROM THE DEATH OF LINCOLN TO THE RISE OF THEODORE
ROOSEVELT 277 (3d ed. 1993).
131. JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT:
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 100 (2000).
132. AHLSTROM, supra note 89, at 972–76, 1006–07; GAUSTAD & SCHMIDT, supra
note 89, at 272–74.
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groups, who proudly proclaimed their American and Christian
identity, spewed forth noxious rhetoric. Foremost among these were
Father Charles E. Coughlin (whose popular radio talk show spread
his invective), the Ku Klux Klan, and the Fundamentalist preacher
Gerald Winrod.133 They blamed Jews, Negroes, Catholics,
immigrants, and their unpatriotic white sympathizers for the moral
decline in the United States. Catholic Alfred E. Smith’s campaign for
the presidency was marred by religious attacks from many in the
Protestant community, as was John Kennedy’s campaign thirty-two
years later. A striking characteristic of many of these movements was
their proud display of the American flag and their insistence that they
represented the real America, as opposed to the immigrants,
foreigners, Catholics, and Jews.
If religious freedom was a founding principle of the republic, as
modern American rhetoric fondly professes, Americans certainly
seem to have been unaware of it until rather recently. For practical
purposes, the Supreme Court did not begin to apply the First
Amendment to support religious freedom claims until the 1920s,
and then only with regard to rights of private religious schools.134 In
the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan proudly paraded unmolested under
American flags down city streets, including Pennsylvania Avenue in
Washington, D.C., while Jehovah’s Witnesses were persecuted for
honoring their God and their belief that pledging the American flag
was a form of idolatry.135 It was not until the 1940s that the first
powerful and inspiring modern decisions regarding religious speech
and other manifestations of religion were published. Perhaps the
most impressive of these decisions, West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, came in the wake of widespread violence
against Jehovah’s Witnesses because of their insistence that their
highest loyalty was to God.136 It was not until 1940 that the Free
Exercise Clause was found to be applicable to the states.137 Social and
political, though not legal, discrimination against Catholics and Jews

133. See GAUSTAD & SCHMIDT, supra note 89, at 274.
134. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
135. For further discussion of the Pledge, flag salute, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, see infra
text accompanying notes 285–95.
136. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
137. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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was open and notorious well into the 1960s.138 And it was not until
the 1960s—with the election of the first Catholic president, John F.
Kennedy, the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and several
decisions of the Supreme Court—that what is now described as “the
first freedom” and the founding principle came to be very widely
accepted—almost two hundred years after the founding of the
United States.139 In short, to imagine that religious freedom is the
first freedom is inaccurate, both historically and constitutionally.
The French and American founding myths of laïcité and of
religious freedom are revered as foundational cornerstones of the
republics; they are described as emerging gloriously from the
historical past; revered as explaining the essence of the nation’s
values; invoked as principles that unite all true citizens of the
republic; promoted as models for export to other nations; and held
to exemplify and embody the universal values of equality, state
neutrality, tolerance, and respect for freedom of conscience.
However much we might admire the modern explanation of such
concepts, we should not overlook that they emerged from periods of
hostility, antagonism, discrimination, and often violence.
IV. LAÏCITÉ, THE HEADSCARF, AND THE STASI COMMISSION
A. The Role of Public Schools in France
France and the United States, like most countries, believe that
public schools are entrusted to teach the nation’s values and histories
138. In his attempt to summarize the hostility of Protestants against Catholics, Dolan
suggests that the animus came not on theological grounds, but from a “debate over the
relationship between religion and nationality. Indeed, it was a question of national identity.”
DOLAN, supra note 121, at 92.
139. Some of the clearest illustrations of the widespread acceptance of religious freedom
in reality (rather than only in myth) were in the 1990s, when broad coalitions—including both
the political Left and Right—supported legislation known as the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, and the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, see
supra note 39. This does not mean that religious freedom is always respected. For many
examples of ongoing discrimination and intolerance against religious minorities in the country
today, see DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A “CHRISTIAN COUNTRY” HAS
NOW BECOME THE WORLD’S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION 294–334 (2001).
The harsher aspects of American religious intolerance are sometimes given passing
recognition. The State Department report, cited previously, stated that religious freedom “was
not easily achieved. Today Americans enjoy religious freedom, but it was not always so. Our
history is not perfect, and yet that very history makes us all the more determined to protect
what has been won.” ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40.
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to their youth. Michael Walzer has observed that every nation strives
“to teach all of its children, whatever their group memberships, the
value of its own constitutional arrangements and the virtues of its
founders, heroes, and current leaders.”140 Traditionally in France,
“the teaching of civic and moral duties was an important part of the
school curriculum, how love for the nation was preached as
something expected of the child, in the same way as love for his
mother.”141 The “greatest function” of the French school was not
academic training, but the teaching of patriotism.142 Theodore
Zeldin argues that in France “universal education and the republic
became inextricably identified with each other.”143 In nineteenthcentury France, at the same time that the state was making education
more secular, “education became almost a substitute for religion;
belief in its virtues reached exceptionally high levels.”144 Because of
the public demands that schools teach national values, the schools
necessarily become a battleground for deciding what those values
are. Just as in the United States,145 French schools frequently become
the focal point for conflicts over defining national values, including
those involving the ideology governing the relationship between
religion and the state. Thus, issues involving laïcité are often
confronted in the schools of France.146 A proposed law in 1983 to
enhance state control over private religious schools “provoked some
of the largest street demonstrations seen in France since World War
140. MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 71 (1997).
141. ZELDIN, supra note 58, at 17.
142. EUGEN WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE MODERNIZATION OF RURAL
FRANCE, 1870–1914, at 332 (1976). Weber further asserted that teaching French history was
the best way to teach patriotism. Id. at 333. In commenting on one aspect of France’s
nineteenth-century transition from principally religious-based education to secular education,
Crubellier and Langlois both note that history was transformed from being a study of the
sacred (“In the beginning, God created . . .” ) to becoming sacred itself (“Our ancestors, the
Gauls . . .”). MAURICE CRUBELLIER, L’ÉCOLE RÉPUBLICAINE, 1870–1940, at 56 (1993);
Langlois, supra note 2, at 154.
143. ZELDIN, supra note 58, at 199.
144. Id. at 140. It is common for historians of the period even to refer to the religious
zeal with which the republicans of the 1880s set about the process of laicization. It was as if
they wished to sacrilize the secular. Ozouf refers to the republicans’ wish to have the schools
“baptized as confessional neutrality.” OZOUF, supra note 2, at 74.
145. See infra Part IV.C.3.
146. Langlois, supra note 2, at 154–56, 169. The distinguished historian Mona Ozouf
has said that, between 1871 and 1914, there were no questions that were more stormy than
those involving issues of education. This is particularly true when it involves the issue of laïcité
in schools. OZOUF, supra note 2, at 5.
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II.”147 In 2003, as the debate on the role of headscarves in France
grew in intensity, former Socialist Prime Minister Laurent Fabius
described public schools in words that might equally have been
employed by political officials in most of the major parties: “[T]he
school is not just one among many places; it is the place where we
mold our little citizens. There are three legs: laïcité, Republic,
school; these are the three legs on which we stand.”148
B. Background and the Emergence of the Headscarf Controversy
In September 1989, in a French town 50 kilometers north of
Paris, three Muslim girls were temporarily barred by officials from
attending public schools because they insisted on wearing Islamic
headscarves.149 A local newspaper seized upon the story and wrote
provocative articles that soon stirred interest throughout the
country.150 In order to respond to the growing controversy, the
Minister of Education, Lionel Jospin (later prime minister),
requested a formal opinion (avis) from the highest French
147. BELL, supra note 80, at 320. After its enactment, portions of the famous “loi
Savary” were held unconstitutional by the French Conseil Constitutionnel.
148. Laurent Fabius, Le Principe émancipateur et unificateur de la laïcité, May 17, 2003,
http://www.psinfo.net/entretiens/fabius/laicite.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
149. I will use the word “headscarf” throughout to refer to the head covering worn by
Muslim girls and women. A variety of words in English, French, and even Arabic are used to
identify the headscarf. The word that is now most commonly used in French is voile, which is
linguistically related to the English “veil.” The other terms that are used, albeit with declining
frequency, are foulard (which means “scarf”) or more specifically foulard Islamique (which of
course means “Islamic scarf.”) Whereas voile or “veil” might suggest that the face is covered, as
in a bridal veil, this is not the sense in which it is now used by the French when discussing the
issue. In France, Catholic nuns who wear a religious habit are also said to wear le voile, just as
“veil” in English is sometimes used to describe a Catholic nun’s clothing. In French, as in
English, voile or “veil” is more likely to bear a religious connotation where foulard or scarf is
not. The Arabic word most commonly used by Muslims in Europe and America to identify the
headscarf is hijab (sometimes transliterated as hejab in French). The correct Qur’anic meaning
of the term hijab—and its implications for women’s attire in the contemporary world—is the
subject of an intense debate even within Muslim communities. For further discussion of this
issue, see infra note 228.
150. Subsequent discussions at the school in the town of Creil led to a temporary
compromise and the girls returned to school a few weeks later. See Guy Coq, Querelle autour
d’un voile, L’HISTOIRE No. 6 (1999), http://www.histoire.presse.fr/archives/coq6.asp (last
visited Mar. 10, 2004). For a personal account of the developments, see the report attributed
to Luis Cardoso, an instructor at the school in Au coer d “l’affaire”: Un Professeur de Creil
témoigne, at http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/Veil2000/articles/coeur1.htm
(last visited Apr. 24, 2004), English version available at http://www.unc.edu/depts/
europe/conferences/Veil2000/articles/translations/Cardoso.doc (last visited May 29, 2004).
For a scholarly discussion of the background, see MESSNER, supra note 35, at 1134.
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administrative court, the Conseil d’État (the Council of State), on
the question whether schoolchildren may wear “insignia” that
identify their religious affiliation in the public schools.151 The
Minister’s query was framed specifically in terms of whether the
wearing of religious clothing in public schools could be reconciled
with the important French doctrine of laïcité. The Conseil d’État’s
response was reasonably clear:
According to recognized constitutional and legislative texts, as well
as the international obligations of France, the principle of laïcité in
state education . . . requires that teaching be conducted with
respect for the principle of neutrality by the teachers and their
programs on the one hand, and with respect for the freedom of
conscience of the students on the other. . . . Such freedom for the
students includes the right to express and to manifest their religious
beliefs inside the schools, while respecting pluralism and the
freedoms of others. . . . The wearing of signs by students in which
they wish to express their membership in a religion is not by itself
incompatible with the principle of laïcité.152

The Conseil d’État asserted that the doctrine of laïcité, as well as
the 1958 Constitution and French obligations under international
law, require respect for the freedom of conscience of students,
including the right to express their beliefs in schools by wearing
religious clothing. The Conseil d’État cautioned, however, that
students could be prevented from wearing religious attire if they
attempted to propagandize others or to disrupt school activities.
School officials were instructed to resolve such issues on a case-bycase basis.153 Many people were unhappy with the Conseil d’État’s

151. The Conseil d’État, among its several responsibilities, is the highest administrative
court in France from which there is no appeal. Its jurisdiction generally involves issues that
arise between the state and its citizens. It has the power to issue advisory opinions, as was the
case here. It may hear separately appeals from lower administrative courts where individuals are
involved in disputes with the state. A Conseiller is among the most prestigious positions in the
French state. For an English-language description of the various functions of the Conseil
d’État, see L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 62–86 (5th
ed. 1998).
152. Avis du Conseil d’État No. 346893 (Nov. 27, 1989), reprinted in JEUFFROY &
TRICARD, supra note 19, at 1031–32; Most judicial decisions of the Conseil d’État are handled
in “Ordinary Assemblies.” Issues that are considered to be of particular importance, as was this,
are decided by the “Plenary Assembly” in which all of the full members (Conseillers d’État)
may participate. See BROWN & BELL, supra note 151, at 70–71.
153. The Ministry of Education issued new regulations following the opinion of the
Conseil d’État, but they are less generous than the opinion of the Conseil d’État would seem to
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decision, and afterwards “one could hear politicians, intellectuals,
and even journalists insist that if the judges [of the Conseil d’État]
refused to heed public opinion, it would be necessary to change the
laws.”154
Since 1989, the number of Muslims has grown rapidly in France,
and Islam is generally described as being the second largest religion
after Catholicism.155 The majority of Muslims in France trace their
origins to former French colonies, particularly Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia. With the growth of Islam, there have been increasing
apprehensions regarding the appearance of Muslim women wearing
the headscarf in public.156 This has created the suspicion among
some that those who wear the headscarf are not really French and
that they prefer their Muslim (or perhaps even Islamic) identity over
their French identity. Thus, the headscarf is increasingly seen as the
symbol of a foreign people—with a foreign religion—who have come
to France, but who do not wish to integrate themselves fully into
French life or accept French values. From this perspective, when the
French see the headscarf they do not feel pride that their country is
tolerant and welcoming of other peoples and religions, but rather
have warranted, and emphasize what is prohibited rather than what is permitted. La Circulaire
du 12 décembre 1989 du ministre d’État, de l’Éducation nationale, de la Jeunesse et des
Sports, reprinted in JEUFFROY & TRICARD, supra note 19, at 1034–35. A circulaire issued by
the Ministry of Education in December 1989 nevertheless suggests that, whenever problems
arise, school officials should attempt to dissuade girls from wearing the headscarf. See
MESSNER, supra note 35, at 1135. Not all officials agreed with the Conseil d’État’s decisions
and some local school officials continued to try to ban headscarves. Id. During the following
years some additional cases came to the Conseil d’État. In some, the schools, despite the 1989
decision, attempted to ban headscarves. Such cases were reversed by the Conseil d’État. In one
case, however, where school girls refused to remove the headscarf in conjunction with physical
education activities, the Conseil d’État supported the local school’s rejection of the demand—
noting in particular that the father of one of the girls had distributed provocative leaflets in
support of his daughter’s case. Id. at 1134–38.
154. MESSNER, supra note 35, at 268.
155. There is no precise figure for the number of Muslims in France, and the estimates
vary by as much as a factor of two, being somewhere in the three million to six million range.
See LE MONDE, Dec. 18, 2003, LEXIS. Of course, combining all Muslims for demographic
purposes is somewhat like combining all Christians. In any case, there are now more Muslims
in France than there are Protestants and Jews combined. Dozens of books have been published
on Muslims in contemporary France. Among those that are best known and most influential
are: DOUNIA BOUZAR, L’ISLAM DE BANLIEUES: LES PRÉDICATEURS MUSULMANS, NOUVEAUX
TRAVAILLEURS SOCIAUX? (2001); JOCELYN CESARY, ÊTRE MUSUSLMAN EN FRANCE:
ASSOCIATIONS, MILITANTS ET MOSQUEES (1994); BRUNO ÉTIENNE, LA FRANCE ET L’ISLAM
(1990); GILLES KEPEL, LES BANLIEUES DE L’ISLAM: NAISSANCE D’UNE RELIGION EN FRANCE
(1987); and XAVIER TERNISIEN, LA FRANCE DES MOSQUEES (2002).
156. For the different words used for “headscarf,” see supra note 149.
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they feel something foreign and non-French has infiltrated their
society. Writing just before the events in 2003 that raised the
headscarf to a sensational media issue, some leading French legal
scholars suggested the possibility that the real concern regarding the
Islamic headscarf may not be related to high principles of a neutral
republican education in public schools, but a deeper unease about
Islam.
The debates regarding the headscarf (foulard) testify to the
suspicion of French society in general regarding active or organized
Islam. This suspicion, which displaced all of the past complex
relations with the Islamic world, has often led to some to imagine,
behind the behavior of some students, a concerted effort to subvert
republican values. The reverberations of the headscarf (voile) issue
in the media and in the political debate reveals a particularly French
sensibility to Islam, which is not expressed in other major European
countries with the same intensity. It is a given that the effects are
difficult to measure in a legal debate.157

Although serious jurists have described the Conseil d’État’s 1989
decision as “nuanced and protective of individual rights,”158 state
officials, at both the national and local levels, repeatedly attempted
to undermine it. After 1989, several contested cases came before the
Conseil d’État concerning attempts by local officials to prohibit
headscarves, as well as directives (circulaires) issued by the Minister
of Education in 1989 and 1994 that attempted to limit the wearing
of headscarves.159 Although the Conseil d’État sometimes rendered
judgments (arrêts) against Muslim schoolgirls or their families on the
grounds that they had been unduly provocative, the vast majority of
the judgments—forty-one of forty-nine by one count—were against
state officials who were improperly attempting to ban headscarves.160
Conflicts related to the headscarves in school never disappeared,
but they had declined in frequency and significance by early 2003.
For example, a report released in November 2000 by the prestigious
French advisory body, the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (High
157. See MESSNER, supra note 35, at 265.
158. See id. at 261.
159. Id. at 267.
160. See id. at 1135–38. The Haut Conseil à l’Intégration reported that “of the 49
disputed cases arriving at the Conseil d’État between 1992 and 1999, 41 led to a reversal of the
decision of the school officials against the girl.” HAUT CONSEIL A L’INTEGRATION, L’ISLAM
DANS LA REPUBLIQUE 50 (2000).
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Council for Integration), expressed its general satisfaction with the
way that the potentially volatile issues surrounding the headscarf
largely had been resolved by the approach recommended by the
Conseil d’État. “Remembering that, for students, laïcité is a
guarantee of their freedom of conscience and their right to manifest
their faith, albeit within the strict limits of preserving order in
schools, the Conseil d’État provided a judicial framework to assist
state officials in preventing and resolving legal difficulties related to
the wearing of the headscarf.”161 This condition apparently prevailed
even after the drama of the attacks of September 11. In December
2001, in a special issue on education, the newspaper Le Monde
concluded that: “Twelve years after headscarves first appeared in
public schools, Islam and the republican schools lived together
almost peacefully.”162 The Traité de droit français de religion,
published in early 2003, concluded that “the jurisprudence of the
Conseil d’État on the question of headscarves has not varied since
1989 and the first judgment of 1992, and the law seems well
established by now.”163 In April 2003, Hanifa Chérifi, the Ministry
of Education official responsible for mediating headscarf disputes in
the nation’s schools, reported that between 1994 (when she began
her work) and 2003, the average number of problematic cases per
year had dropped from 300 to 150.164
To the extent that there was a sense of confidence, progress, and
calm early in 2003, it was only a calm before the storm. By the end
of 2003, the issue of headscarves in schools had become the subject
of a national media frenzy. Despite the fact that there were no
dramatic new cases pertaining to schools and headscarves, by
December of that year the subject was the most prevalent and
controversial topic in the country. Many of the leading politicians,
intellectuals, religious figures, and sociologists were either being
interviewed by or writing articles for television, newspapers,
magazines, and journals. The issue fully seized the popular

161. HAUT CONSEIL A L’INTEGRATION, supra note 160, at 51.
162. L’École en première ligne, LE MONDE DE L’EDUCATION, Dec. 2001, at 23.
163. See MESSNER, supra note 35, at 1137; see also GARAY & TAWILL, supra note 6, at
225 (stating that the rules imposed by the Conseil d’État were “simple and clear”).
164. Polémique: Sous le voile islamique, l’oppression des femmes, J. L’Humanité, Apr. 30,
2003, http://www.humanite.presse.fr/popup_print.php3?id_article=371214 (last visited Mar.
1, 2004) (interviewing Hanifa Chérifi); see also GARAY & TAWILL, supra note 6, at 225 (stating
that “at the beginning of 2003, the French were not particularly excited about the issue”).

458

GUN-FIN

419]

7/3/2004 1:32 PM

Religious Freedom and Laïcité

imagination. A high percentage of the French population wanted
Islamic headscarves banned from schools, and a clear majority even
wanted them banned from streets and other public spaces.165 What
caused the truce suddenly to collapse and result in a demand for a
law that would prohibit the headscarf at public schools?
The facts of the chronology are easier to identify than the
underlying motives, interests, or political strategies of those involved.
The first major salvo came on April 3, 2003, during a radio interview
of Prime Minister Raffarin, who told his interviewers that
headscarves should “absolutely” be prohibited in public schools.166
Two weeks later, on April 19, the Minister of the Interior, Nicolas
Sarkozy, when addressing a meeting of the Union of Islamic
Organizations of France, provocatively said (given the audience) that
women should be required to remove headscarves when having their
official identification photographs taken.167 The Reuters account of
the meeting suggested that Sarkozy had “relaunched” the debate on
headscarves and that it could become “one of the most important
subjects of discussion” between the recently elected Muslim councils
and the French state. Both Prime Minister Raffarin and Interior
Minister Sarkozy were, of course, in the conservative governing party
of France, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP). On April 29,
during his attendance at a meeting of the National Assembly, Prime
Minister Raffarin was asked a question by Deputy François Baroin:
Is it not time, Mr. Prime Minister, to reaffirm forcefully the idea,
which really is quite simple, that laïcité is the first sentinel and the
ultimate bulwark of the unity of the nation? It appears essential to
me to preserve the law of 1905 and its fundamental principles.
How can we make it possible for state representatives, particularly
those in education—our republican sanctuary—to experience less
daily uncertainty about legal issues? Haze and ambiguity are

165. For public opinion data, see supra note 6.
166. Interview by C. Ockrent & G. Leclerc with Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Prime Minister of
France 7–8 (Apr. 3, 2003), http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/ressources/fichiers/
0304feeraffarin.pdf (last visited May 15, 2004). In his few words on the subject, Raffarin did
not specifically suggest that Parliament should enact a new law. Some commentators later
assumed that this was exactly what he had intended and that this was the first suggestion by a
major governmental official to propose a law banning headscarves.
167. The Interior Ministry is responsible for state security, the national police, and citizen
identification documents. It also houses the office responsible for regulating and supervising
issues related to religious organizations.
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actually the loyal allies of fundamentalists and all types can cause
harm to an essential part of our social pact.168

In response to this question, the Prime Minister exclaimed that a
“debate on the school and its future is taking place today throughout
France!”—public schools are “the first place of the Republic” and
they must not be threatened by “conspicuous signs (signes
ostentatoires) of communalism” nor by “similar things that appear,
from time to time, such as zealots, that need to be condemned in the
name of republican laïcité.”169 By amending the law,
we will nourish the concept of laïcité, giving it even more force in
modernity! We must make it clear that our national consensus is
affirmed and we all must make it clear during the debate that
schools must remain the space par excellence of the Republic, and
therefore of laïcité!170

Deputy Baroin’s question to the Prime Minister on laïcité was
not spontaneous. Baroin was the official spokesman for the UMP,
the Prime Minister’s party. On the same day that he posed his
question in the National Assembly, Baroin also published an editorial
in the conservative newspaper Le Figaro in which he praised the
Prime Minister for having “opportunely” opened the debate on
laïcité, and he also applauded the Minister of the Interior for having
“courageously” taken a position.171 Earlier in the year, Baroin himself
had been asked by the Prime Minister to prepare his own report on
laïcité, which was completed and delivered to the President and
Prime Minister a few days before the latter’s visit to the National
Assembly. Baroin’s report was released publicly in late April, and in it
he recommended that the Parliament enact a law to “proscribe
wearing the headscarf (voile) in schools.”172
In a magazine article that also appeared in late April, Socialist
Deputy Jack Lang (a former minister of education) reversed his prior
position, in which he had supported the jurisprudence of the Conseil
d’État, and announced that he would propose a law in the National

168. Débats parlementaires, Journal Officiel de la République Française, 2d Sess., Apr.
29, 2003, at 3212.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. François Baroin, Société face au développement des revendications communautaristes;
Pour un ‘code de la laïcité,’ LE FIGARO, Apr. 29, 2003.
172. FRANÇOIS BAROIN, POUR UNE NOUVELLE LAÏCITE 18 (2003).
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Assembly to prohibit “all external signs of religious adherence” in
public schools.173 On May 17, Laurent Fabius, a Socialist deputy in
the National Assembly (and former prime minister), addressed a
party congress.174 Fabius advocated the adoption of a new law that
would prohibit the display of religious symbols (including the
headscarf, skullcap, and cross) in public schools. Acknowledging that
while the Conseil d’État had acted in good faith in making its school
decisions, he nevertheless argued that it was not their “function” to
make decisions about religious attire in schools and that their
reasoning was “casuistic” and “not tenable.”175 Ten days later, on
May 27, the National Assembly established a parliamentary Inquiry
Commission on the Question of Wearing Religious Signs at School
(“Inquiry Commission”).176 Thus, by the end of June, less than three
months after Raffarin’s original statement, several prominent
members of the National Assembly, including former ministers, had

173. Eric Conan, Jack Lang: “Interdire tout signe religieux,” L’EXPRESS, April 30, 2003,
http://www.lexpress.fr/info (last visited Mar. 10, 2004) (interviewing Socialist Deputy Jack
Lang). Lang ultimately introduced his bill on November 18, 2003, which would have
prohibited all “apparent” signs that were “religious, political, or philosophical.” Proposition de
loi no. 1227 (Nov. 18, 2003). One can imagine the absurd questions that would confront
school officials attempting to enforce the Lang proposal. A sweatshirt emblazoned with a
drawing of “Descartes the philosopher” would be prohibited, but one labeled “Descartes the
mathematician” would be permitted. “Noam Chomsky the linguist” would be acceptable but
not “Chomsky the political critic.” And a t-shirt with a photo of Albert Einstein would be
acceptable if praising him as a physicist, but would be impermissible if prasing him as a
campaigner against nuclear weapons. Lang’s proposal to introduce a law to prohibit religious
attire was not the first, but it was the first by a present or former minister. Baroin had proposed
such a law in his report to the Prime Minister, and two bills had already been introduced in the
National Assembly by members of conservative parties, Proposition de loi no. 172 (Aug. 1,
2002) (proposed by Jacques Myard (UMP)), and Proposition de loi no. 500 (Dec. 18, 2002)
(proposed by Maurice Leroy (UDF)).
174. Fabius, supra note 148.
175. In the French context, this is a remarkable observation. The jurisdiction of the
Conseil d’État covers all state bureaucracies, including the schools. There is no other court in
France that has the jurisdiction to cover such issues.
176. The parliamentary Inquiry Commission publicly released its multi-volume report on
December 18, 2003, one day after President Chirac announced his proposal to prohibit
conspicuous religious signs at school. ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, RAPPORT NO. 1275 (Dec. 4,
2003). The final report of the Inquiry Commission appears in three sections available at:
http://www.assemblee-nat.fr/12/pdf/rapports/r1275-t1.pdf, http://www.assemblee-nat.fr/
12/pdf/rapports/r1275-t2.pdf, and http://www.assemblee-nat.fr/12/pdf/rapports/r1275t2.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
Without speculating on the motives for the timing of the President’s speech, it can be
said that the Stasi Report, see infra note 177, and the presidential speech completely
overshadowed the issuance of the Inquiry Commission’s report and recommendations.
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proposed that a law governing headscarves in schools be enacted and
the Parliament had begun its own investigation and analysis.
On July 3, President Chirac announced that he too wished to
create a commission that would study the issue and report to him by
the end of 2003. He issued a decree creating a “commission charged
with conducting an analysis of the application of the principle of
laïcité in the Republic,”177 which became widely known as the Stasi
Commission after the name of its chairman, Bernard Stasi. The
Commission’s report (“Stasi Report” or “Commission Report”),
which will be discussed in the following section, was issued on
December 11, 2003.178 The Commission made several
recommendations, including the improvement of living standards in
some economically depressed communities and advocated improving
education about both religion and laïcité. But the media focused
almost exclusively on only one of the Commission’s
recommendations: banning “clothing and signs manifesting religious
or political affiliation” from public schools.179
Less than one week after the Commission issued its report,
President Chirac delivered his response in a televised speech, quoted
above, on December 17, 2003.180 The President praised the Stasi
Commission generously. He nevertheless adopted only half of one of
its recommendations and either ignored or rejected the others. He
proposed a law to ban conspicuous religious clothing (he said
nothing about also banning political insignia as had been
recommended).181 The principal portion of the President’s speech
consisted of praise for the glories of laïcité, after which he briefly
announced his support for a law to ban conspicuous religious
clothing. The President did not identify with specificity the logical
connection between laïcité and the particular recommendation to
ban religious clothing, almost as if the relationship were so obvious
177. Commission chargée de mener une réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité
dans la République, Décret No. 2003-607 of July 3, 2003, J.O., July 4, 2003, p. 11319. The
official name, as specified in the decree, varies only slightly from that which the commission
itself used, la Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de la laïcité dans la
République.
178. RAPPORT AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE [hereinafter STASI REPORT] (2003),
http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/034000725/0000.pdf (last visited Mar.
10, 2004).
179. Id. at 68.
180. See Chirac, Elysée Palace Speech, supra note 18.
181. Id.

462

GUN-FIN

419]

7/3/2004 1:32 PM

Religious Freedom and Laïcité

that it need not be explained. The media and a wide range of the
French political spectrum praised the speech effusively for being
tactful, nuanced, and balanced, without noting the fact that he
ignored most of the Commission’s recommendations or that he
assumed rather than demonstrated the logic of the relationship
between approving of laïcité and prohibiting headscarves. The
French Parliament acted promptly. On February 10, 2004, the
National Assembly adopted the law, followed on March 3 by the
Senate. The law was signed by the President and Prime Minister on
March 15, 2004.182
C. The Stasi Commission Report
1. The background and discussion of laïcité and the law
The official decree creating the Stasi Commission provided it
with the “responsibility of conducting an inquiry on the application
of the principle of laïcité in the Republic and to make suitable
proposals.”183 This vague instruction said nothing about public
schools, headscarves, or religious clothing. In a July 3, 2003, letter
to the Commission’s chairman, President Chirac provided some
additional guidance regarding his expectations by reaffirming the
importance of the doctrine of laïcité to France and reiterating that
French society respects the particularities of every religion.184
Without referring to Islam directly, he made an unveiled reference to
“communitarian” problems, and, without mentioning headscarves
specifically, the President stated that “incidents” connected with the
wearing of “religious insignia” (insignes religieux) had raised
difficulties for employers and teachers. The President asked that the
Commission provide him with an analysis of the issues, and he
offered to make available state offices and resources for the
Commission’s use. The official decree was thus drafted in very
general terms, and the presidential letter was only somewhat more
specific.
The members of the Stasi Commission, however, had no
difficulty identifying the issue that was of foremost concern to the
President, the media, and the public: headscarves in public schools.
182. Law No. 2004-228, supra note 4.
183. Décret No. 2003-607, supra note 177, art. 1.
184. STASI REPORT, supra note 178, at 2–3.
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The sixteen-member Commission, which included some
distinguished scholars and officials,185 acknowledged that the “public
debate is centered on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf by young
girls and more largely on the wearing of religious and political
symbols at school.”186 The Commission referred to the “headscarf
affair” as “highlighted by the media” and also referred to how it had
become “a symbol”187 and an “explosive” issue.188
The Commission Report is presented in four parts: first, a
general discussion of the principle of laïcité as a universal and
republican value;189 second, laïcité as a judicial concept;190 third,
challenges to laïcité in schools and the workplace;191 and fourth,
recommendations.192 The Commission made several broad, positive,
and constructive recommendations regarding religion, the state,
diversity, and the promotion of the Arabic language and Islamic
education.193 Nevertheless, the portion of the report that predictably

185. The members included, in addition to Bernard Stasi and the rapporteurs,
Mohammed Arkoun, Jean Baubérot, Hanifa Chérifi, Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, Régis Debray,
Michel Delebarre, Nicole Guedj, Ghislaine Hudson, Gilles Kepel, Marceau Long, Nelly Olin,
Henri Pena-Ruiz, Gaye Petek, Maurice Quenet, René Remond, Raymond Soubie, Alain
Touraine, and Patrick Weil. I have great respect for many of the members of this Commission,
who are among the leading scholars in their fields. It is surprising that such respected
authorities could have adopted a document that falls so far below the quality of their individual
work.
186. STASI REPORT, supra note 178, at 57.
187. Id. at 29.
188. The Commission noted that the Conseil d’État had “faced, for fifteen years, an
explosive situation that the parliament did not want to handle.” Id. at 31.
189. Id. at 10–18.
190. Id. at 19–36.
191. Id. at 37–49.
192. Id. at 50–65. The Commission’s seventy-eight page final report referred to and
identified approximately 200 witnesses who testified before them publicly, and acknowledged
that some unidentified witnesses testified behind closed doors because of their fears of possible
reprisals.
193. The Commission recommended, inter alia, that state schools should be available
throughout France, which is not presently the case, id. at 39, 53; there should be more
Muslim chaplains in hospitals, the military, and schools, id. at 39, 61, 64; there should be
greater accommodation for the religious needs of the families of the deceased pertaining to
burials, id. at 40, 65; a charter of laïcité should be drafted, id. at 50; there should be no
separate reconsideration of the legal regime of Alsace-Moselle (where official French laïcité is
not applied for historical reasons), id.; schools should provide better instruction on the values
of republicanism and laïcité, id. at 51–52; there should be a “national priority” to combat
discrimination in cities, id. at 52; Arabic language studies should be enhanced, id at 54; there
should be greater respect for diversity in education, id. at 55; the prohibition against state
officials wearing religious clothing (described as “strict neutrality”) should continue, id. at 55–
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captured media attention was its proposal that a law be enacted to
prohibit the wearing of “conspicuous” religious and political attire in
public schools.194
2. Laïcité, neutrality, equality, and freedom of conscience
The Stasi Commission describes laïcité in terms similar to those
uttered by President Chirac and other political leaders (described in
II.A. above). According to the Stasi Commission, “France has raised
laïcité to the rank of a founding value.”195 It is a “cornerstone”
(pierre angulaire) of the republican pact.196 “It is today the subject
of widespread consensus: everyone accepts it.”197 It is a “widely
shared”198 value or perhaps even “shared by everyone.”199 This
cornerstone is a product of French history. “To understand the
history of laïcité is to understand the richness of its meanings.”200
“Laïcité is a constitutive element of our collective history.”201 It is
the “fruit of history”202 and it would be “dangerous”203 if it were to
fail. In addition to being a foundational value of the republic, it is
56; teaching about religion should be improved, id. at 63; the state should encourage
advanced studies on Islam, id. at 63; nonbelievers should have better access to broadcast
media, id. at 64; religiously acceptable foods should be more readily available in schools,
hospitals, and prisons, id. at 38–39, 64; and businesses and schools should better
accommodate the wishes of believers to attend religious ceremonies, id. at 65. Some of these
recommendations, such as promoting diversity in education, seem flatly contradictory to the
Commission’s recommendation to ban religious clothing.
194. The report was unanimous on all of its recommendations, with only one exception,
an abstention by the scholar Jean Baubérot regarding the ban on religious clothing.
195. STASI REPORT, supra note 178, at 9. This is repeated verbatim later in the report.
Id. at 69.
196. Id. at 9.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 12.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 10.
201. Id. There is a brief recognition in the Stasi Report that laïcité sometimes caused
conflicts, and the Civil Constitution of the Clergy is cited as an example. Id. at 10–11. For the
Civil Constitution of the Clergy, see supra discussion accompanying note 55. The Stasi Report
characterizes the nineteenth century as a struggle between two forms of laïcité: the combative
model of Emile Combes, and the other that was more “liberal and tolerant,” id. at 11, of
Aristide Briand, Jules Ferry, and Jean Jaurès. The more liberal and tolerant version identified
by the Commission is the one that unilaterally prohibited congregations, revoked the
Concordat of 1801, and nationalized church property, leaving the clergy without lands or
salaries.
202. Id. at 50.
203. Id.
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also a value that unites citizens in a common purpose. Laïcité “must
allow the citizen to create a harmonious place in the shared public
space. . . . [Laïcité] creates the possibility of reconciling lives in
pluralism and diversity.”204 It is a “conception of the common
good.”205 Its “cardinal principles” include respect, liberty, and living
together.206 “Laïcité can serve as the leaven of integration of
everyone in society.”207
Finally, laïcité rests on three interconnected values: “liberty of
conscience, equality of rights in spiritual and religious choices, and
neutrality of political power.”208 The Stasi Report repeatedly returns
to these three values of neutrality (“neutrality of the state is the first
condition of laïcité”),209 equality (“neutrality and equality act as a
pair”),210 and freedom of conscience (“liberty of conscience” is a
“judicial pillar” of laïcité, “especially with respect to freedom of
worship.”)211 The Commission also insisted that laïcité conforms to
international law.212
3. The limitation of rights: “public order,” headscarves, and religious
attire
Under well-established French law, the state can limit the
exercise of rights—such as wearing religious clothing—only when
the restriction can be justified as promoting the “public order”
(l’ordre public).213 This public order doctrine refers to the “traditional

204. Id. at 36. This is repeated verbatim later in the report, id. at 69.
205. Id. at 9.
206. Id. at 12.
207. Id. at 18.
208. Id. at 9.
209. Id. at 22. Neutrality is identified as a value of laïcité. Id.
210. Id. Equality is identified as a value of laïcité. Id.at 9, 13, 15, 36–39, 50–51, 66.
211. Id. at 23. Freedom of conscience is identified as a value of laïcité. Id. at 10–11, 14–
16, 19, 22–29, 50, 58, 66.
212. Id. at 21.
213. For discussions of l’ordre public, as well as the interrelated concepts of the “general
interest” and the rights and liberties of others, see ROBERT & DUFFAR, supra note 35, at 743–
49 (discussing freedom of assembly); MESSNER, supra note 35, at 46, 451–52, 1099–1101.
The “public order” basis for limiting rights of religion and conscience is expressly
provided in two fundamental laws: (1) article 10 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man of
Aug. 26, 1789, which provides that “[n]o one may be disturbed on the basis of opinions,
including religious opinions, provided that the manifestations do not interfere with the public
order established by law”; and (2) article 1 of the Law on the Separation of Churches and the
State of Dec. 9, 1905, supra note 82, which provides that the “[r]epublic guarantees freedom
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function of government, permitting restrictions on individual liberty
to be imposed so as to ‘maintain public security, tranquility, and
health.’”214 Thus the Stasi Commission, in recommending the
prohibition on religious clothing in public schools, justified its
recommendations in accordance with this doctrine: “The
Commission, after having heard different points of view, finds that
the question today is no longer liberty of conscience, but the
maintenance of public order.”215 The Stasi Report in fact referred to
the public order more than two dozen times.216
The Stasi Commission justified its recommendation to ban
religious attire on two specific public order grounds: (1) to respond
to the coercion suffered by Muslim girls whose families and
communities force them to wear headscarves against their will (and
because such coercion exacerbates sexual discrimination and religious
polarization within France); and (2) to respond to administrative
difficulties suffered by school officials who are forced to implement
confusing directives in situations of intense pressure.217 The
discussion below will focus on three specific issues arising from these
public order justifications for recommending prohibition of religious
attire in schools: (a) how fairly and accurately the Commission
identified the reasons that Muslim girls wear headscarves to school;

of conscience. It also guarantees the free exercise of religion under the sole restrictions that are
specified in this law as being in the interest of public order.”
For discussion of the meaning of article 10 of the Declaration, see MESSNER, supra note
35, at 386–87; see also Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of Aug. 26, 1789, art. 4
(“Liberty consists of being able to do whatever does not harm others; though the exercise of
natural rights of each man must not limit the rights guaranteed to other members of society to
enjoy the same rights. Such limits can only be determined by law.”).
214. BELL, supra note 80, at 83 (quoting LEON DUGUIT, TRAITE DE DROIT
CONSTITUTIONNEL 728 (2d ed. 1923)). While American jurists might see public order as an
unduly vague doctrine that is susceptible to manipulation and abuse, it is well respected and is
an integral aspect of French law. French “public order” might be analogized to the common
law doctrine of reasonableness. Although the two terms do not have an equivalent meaning,
they are both traditional terms that are fully integrated and accepted legal discourse despite the
fact that they are vague.
215. STASI REPORT, supra note 178, at 58.
216. Id. at 10–11, 14, 23, 25–26, 30, 40, 56–59. So, for example, “The laïc state must
not remain indifferent, because troubles to the public order, coercion, threats, racist and
discriminatory practices, which are justified on the basis of religious or spiritual arguments,
undermine the foundations of the school.” Id. at 15. “In too many schools, the testimony has
shown that the identity conflicts [between religions] can become a cause of violence, leading to
attacks on individual liberties and provoking troubles to the public order.” Id. at 56–57.
217. Id. at 31.
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(b) how clearly and objectively the Commission identified and
described the scope of the problems faced by public school officials;
and (c) how well the Commission explained the nexus between the
problem of coercion on Muslim girls to wear headscarves and its
recommendation to prohibit religious attire in schools.
a. The explanation of why Muslim girls wear headscarves to school.
The Commission made the following statements to explain why
Muslim girls wear headscarves:
Young men force them to wear enveloping and asexual clothing
and to lower their gaze whenever they see a man; if they do not
comply, they are stigmatized as “whores.”218
The headscarf is sometimes imposed on pre-adolescent girls by
violence. Once they have put on the headscarf, they can enter into
the staircases of apartment buildings and go into the public without
fear of being conspicuous, even mistreated, as they were when their
heads were uncovered. The headscarf thus offers, paradoxically, the
protection that should have been guaranteed by the Republic.219
They appear as the “silent majority,” victims of pressure imposed
by the family or community, the young women need to be
protected . . . .220
There are pressures placed on these young minor girls to force
them to wear religious insignia. The family and social environment
imposes a choice on them that is not their own. The Republic
cannot remain deaf to the cry of distress of these young girls. The
schools must be for them a place of liberty and emancipation.221

In only two sentences did the Commission even acknowledge
the possibility that some Muslim girls might voluntarily choose to
wear the headscarf, and even these two sentences minimize the
seriousness of the possibility.222 Thus the Commission clearly
218. Id. at 46.
219. Id. at 47.
220. Id. at 58.
221. Id.
222. Some “young girls and women voluntarily wear the headscarf, but others wear it
under constraint or pressure.” Id. at 47. Wearing the veil “could be a personal choice or, to the
contrary, it could be under duress (contrainte), which is particularly intolerable for the
youngest.” Id. at 57.
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suggests that the overwhelming reason that headscarves are worn in
France is due to unwarranted coercion on Muslim girls who are
therefore victims of an oppressive community. But on what evidence
did the Commission base these findings? There are three significant
weaknesses in this regard.
(1) Poor methodology in identifying the problem. Having
identified the public debate as being centered on young girls wearing
the headscarf, the Commission presumably should have undertaken
an inquiry to determine why headscarves are worn. We might have
imagined that the Commission, using the extensive state resources
that were placed at its disposal, would have conducted a serious
inquiry to determine why Muslim girls wear the headscarf and then
attempted to quantify the results. Such an inquiry could have been
conducted using standard social-science techniques, such as in-depth
interviews or other surveys, which would best assure that the girls
were able to respond freely and accurately. We can easily imagine a
wide variety of possible answers that might have been given to the
question, “why do you wear the headscarf?”223 A serious
investigation of the issue might also have asked Muslim girls who do
not wear the headscarf why they do not, as well as why their friends
do. Further questions could be posed to those who have changed
their minds, either from not wearing to wearing or vice versa. There
are many tools available to social scientists to attempt to understand
such issues—if they genuinely wish to know the answers.
The Stasi Commission, however, neither conducted its own
scientific analysis of why French Muslim girls wear the headscarf nor
reported that it had attempted to learn the answer through a
conscientious review of the available social-science literature. This
failure might be analogized to that of a hypothetical commission
appointed to make recommendations on teenage smoking, but
which neglected to provide any objective evidence about why
teenagers smoke. The only evidence the Commission cites in support

223. Among the variety of (nonmutually exclusive) possible responses: because I am
forced to wear it by my brothers and father; for reasons of personal modesty; because it is
commanded by the Qur’an; as a statement of solidarity with Islamists; as a protest against my
father who is not a good Muslim; because it makes me feel part of a larger community; because
I want to show solidarity for my sister who was attacked when she wore it; because it annoys
the French; as a protest against the fashion that exploits the female body; as a way of telling
men that I am not available sexually.
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of its finding that coercion is the basis for wearing headscarves came
from unnamed witnesses, some of whom were interviewed behind
closed doors.224
It is, of course, possible that many Muslim girls in France are, as
the Commission suggests, coerced into wearing headscarves. We can
also imagine the very real possibility that some are threatened with
bodily harm if they do not conform to family or community wishes.
To the extent that this is happening, as it presumably is in at least
some cases, the Commission is entirely justified in identifying it,
explaining it, and condemning it. The Commission’s weakness,
however, was its failure to offer any systematic data or quantification
to show the pervasiveness and gravity of the problem. Perhaps the
dramatic closed-door cases that the Commission heard were
completely true, but nevertheless quite rare. Perhaps they were
representative examples of a widespread phenomenon. Perhaps they
were typical phenomena in some communities, but completely
absent in others. Answers to such questions could help inform a
rational and nuanced analysis and help make effective
recommendations. The Commission, however, relies solely on
anecdotes offered in secret and on unattributed testimony.
(2) Failure to take rights seriously. The most conspicuous fault
in the Commission Report was its failure to have taken seriously the
rights of religion and conviction of those who wish to wear religious
attire. The Conseil d’État, the highest relevant judicial authority, had
decided that the French Constitution and international law give
children “the right to express and to manifest religious beliefs inside
the schools.”225 The Commission, however, never raises these
constitutional rights as an issue that merited serious consideration.226
Although the Commission cited sympathetically examples of
Muslims who did not want to wear the headscarf, the girls who
chose to wear headscarves were treated as if they were invisible or
unworthy of being taken seriously. Nor did the Commission discuss
the impact of their recommendation on the rights of Jews or Sikhs,
the other religions that are most likely to be affected by a ban on

224. STASI REPORT, supra note 178, at 47.
225. Avis du Conseil d’État No. 346893, supra note 19.
226. See supra note 222.
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religious clothing for religious or cultural reasons.227 One could
imagine that a conscientious report could have considered fully the
rights of conscience that were involved, but nevertheless concluded,
with a thoughtful and nuanced explanation, that other interests
ultimately have a more compelling justification. But the Stasi
Commission, which devoted many pages of its report to expressing
its admiration for the doctrine of laïcité, did not devote even one
sentence to describing or explaining the rights of conscience that might
be infringed if its recommendation were to be implemented.
In reality, the issues surrounding religious beliefs regarding the
Islamic headscarf are extremely complex. Muslims have a wideranging and energetic debate about what Islam requires (or merely
enjoins) regarding women wearing head coverings. Some believe
that the headscarf is merely a cultural tradition that has nothing to
do with Islam, while others believe that it is commanded by the
Qur’an, supported by ahadith, and required by leading schools of
Islamic jurisprudence and by important scholars for hundreds of
years.228 There are wide varieties of practice regarding the headscarf
227. Nor, for that matter, did it even mention the consequences of its recommendation
on clothing bearing political expression, which it also recommended prohibiting.
228. Opinions within the Muslim community vary widely regarding whether women are
required or enjoined to wear the headscarf. The core of the religious debate typically centers
on the interpretation of four verses (or ayat) from the Qur’an (24:30–31, 24:60, 33:59, and
33:53), as well as some ahadith (testimonies by witnesses about sayings or actions of the
Prophet). The larger debate includes the historical and cultural varieties of the meaning of the
terms used in the Qur’an: whether particular Qur’anic injunctions pertain to women generally
or only the Prophet’s wives, and whether men have used the covering of females as a means of
retaining social control over women. While it is true that some fundamentalist Muslims have
politicized the debate in insisting on wearing headscarves, some secular Muslims also have
politicized the debate by arguing, incorrectly, that only fundamentalist Muslims advocate the
headscarf.
The three Arabic words in the Qur’an that are most frequently invoked in modern
discussions of headscarves are hijab, (sometimes transliterated as hejab in French), jilbab, and
khimar. The Arabic word that contemporary European and American Muslims most often use
to describe women’s head coverings is hijab. The root of the word hijab appears seven times in
the Qur’an (7:46, 33:53, 38:32, 41:5, 42:51, 17:45, and 19:17). The word khumur (singular
khimar) appears at 24:30–31. The word jilbab appears at 33:59. There are other verses in the
Qur’an pertaining to women’s dress, but they speak of righteousness and modesty generally,
without using specific words to describe particular items of clothing or coverings. See Qur’an
7:26. The passage that arguably is the most important is 24:30–31. Although many
translations of the Qur’an use the word “veil” in this verse, the relevant Arabic word is
khumur, which, arguably, refers to a “covering” wrapping the torso and does not refer to the
head at all. Most scholars agree that verse 24:30–31 means, at a minimum, that all women
must cover their breasts completely and that their breasts must not reveal any movement while
women are walking or performing other activities. Although modern European and American
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throughout the Muslim world, and practices have changed over
time. This may be analogized to Christian attitudes toward the cross
and the crucifix, which also have elicited dramatically different
interpretations over time and among different Christian
communities. Whereas some Catholics and Orthodox believe that
the cross should be venerated, some Christians see devotion to the
cross as superstitious or perhaps even idolatrous. Just as the headscarf
can be manipulated by certain groups to send an ideological
message, so can the cross be manipulated to send messages, whether
by vigilantes in white hoods or crusaders in armor.
Secular state commissions presumably are not qualified to decide
theological questions about what the cross should mean to
Christians or what the headscarf should mean to Muslims.
Disagreements about the meaning of symbols runs throughout all
religions, and what some may believe to be sacred, others—including
coreligionists—may see as superstitious. While the state presumably
should not decide such matters, it nevertheless should respect—and
protect—the right of its citizens to make their own judgments about
such matters, just as the Conseil d’État had determined. The Stasi
Commission, however, chose to apply a harsh interpretation of
laïcité that reflects its confrontational past rather than its mythic
values of neutrality, equality, and tolerance.
(3) Inconsistency regarding coercion. Because of its criticism of
those who coerce Muslim girls to wear the headscarf, we might have
imagined that the Commission would have taken a position of
Muslims typically use hijab in the way “headscarf” has been used here, it is argued by some
that in the relevant texts from the Qur’an, hijab actually refers to a curtain that Muhammad
used to separate his wives from male visitors and is not a piece of clothing. Of the four
principal schools of Sunni Islam, three conclude that women should cover their heads. Perhaps
the leading hadith on this issue is from the scholar Abu-Dawud: “Aisha [wife of the Prophet]
said: Asma, daughter of Abu Bakr, entered upon the Apostle of Allah (peace be upon him)
wearing thin clothes. The Apostle of Allah (peace be upon him) turned his attention from her.
He said: O Asma’, when a woman reaches the age of menstruation, it does not suit her that she
displays her parts of body except this and this, and he pointed to her face and hands.” SUNAN
ABU-DAWUD, Book XXXII, no. 4092, http://www2.iiu.edu.my/deed/hadith/abudawood/
027_sat.html (last visited May 15, 2004). This, however, is a weak hadith (i.e., mursal) as
Abu-Dawud himself recognized, because there is no record of the person who transmitted it
from Aisha. See ABD AL-HALIM ABOU CHOUQQA, 3 ENCYCLOPÉDIE DE LA FEMME EN ISLAM
63–66 (2000); see also DOUNIA BOUZAR & SAIDA KADA, L’UNE VOILÉE, L’AUTRE PAS (2003);
MUSLIM WOMEN’S CHOICES: RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND SOCIAL REALITY 8–12 (Camillia Fawzi
El-Solh & Judy Mabro eds., 1994); ANNE SOFIE ROALD, WOMEN IN ISLAM: THE WESTERN
EXPERIENCE 254–94 (2001).
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principled opposition to coercion in matters of conscience or even
religious attire. A careful reading of the Stasi Report, however,
reveals that the Commission is highly selective in its condemnation
of coercion; indeed, the only form of coercion that the Commission
Report specifically condemns is coercion that results in the wearing
of religious head coverings. For example, the Commission never
acknowledges the existence of the intense social pressure in France
on Muslim girls not to wear headscarves. Schools have been
attempting to ban them since 1989, leading French politicians have
condemned them, and employers have pressured Muslim women not
to wear headscarves. We also can imagine that some fathers pressure
their teenage daughters not to wear the headscarf. The Commission
never mentions, let alone condemns, such coercion by school
teachers, administrators, policemen, or others.
The inconsistency in its objection to coercion is further displayed
in the Commission’s discussion of Jewish boys wearing the skullcap.
The Stasi Report describes the threats to Jewish boys wearing the
skullcap, suggesting that it believes that these threats are wrong.229
Yet its proposed remedy is exactly the opposite of what it
recommended for the Muslim girls. Whereas the Commission argued
that the state had a responsibility to combat the pressure against girls
who do not want to wear the headscarf, the Commission’s
recommendation was to accede to those who were harassing Jewish
boys by giving the harassers exactly what they wanted: removal of
Jewish skullcaps.
Thus, the Commission does not take a principled and consistent
stand against coercion or threats in matters of conscience or belief.
Its highly selective objection to coercion emerges only when
coercion results in the wearing of the headscarf. Indeed, by
recommending its own form of coercion—denial of state educational
benefits to boys and girls who wish to wear religious head
coverings—the Commission commits exactly the same offense that it
freely condemned in others.
b. The administrative problems in public schools. The Stasi
Commission asserts that religious symbols are “troubling” the peace
in schools.230 It suggests:

229. STASI REPORT, supra note 178, at 48.
230. Id. at 41.
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[F]or the school community as a whole, the wearing of the veil is
too often a source of conflicts, of divisions, and even of suffering.
The visible character of religious insignia is resented by many as
contrary to the school’s mission which should be a place of
neutrality and a place for awakening critical awareness. It is also an
affront to the principles and values of the school, especially in
teaching equality between men and women.231

In addition to the disruptions of the peace in schools, the Stasi
Commission also asserted that school administrators have been
burdened by difficulties in understanding and applying the law as
interpreted by the Conseil d’État. The Commission determined that
in the fifteen years following the 1989 decision, it had become
increasingly difficult for local officials to make their decisions on a
“case-by-case” basis, particularly because they are “often isolated in a
difficult environment.”232 In addition, the Commission recognized
that it can be difficult for officials to understand where the lines
should be drawn among religious symbols, as well as which actions
impermissibly promote proselytism and which do not.233 Some
school officials have been in “disarray” due to the “heterogeneity” of
these situations and the “pressures exerted by local forces.”234 Thus,
the Commission is suggesting that local schools are in confusion due
to conflicts and the difficulty of applying the guidance of the Conseil
d’État. Once again, it is appropriate to ask: what evidence does the
Commission offer to support its suggestions that peace has been
disrupted in schools and that administrators are finding it difficult to
understand the law?
We would have expected that a Commission whose members
included some leading French social scientists would have begun its
work by identifying with specificity the nature and the scope of the
problem faced by public schools in France. We could have expected
that the Commission would quantify answers to questions such as:
How many Muslim girls are there in French public schools? How
many in private religious schools? How many girls wear the headscarf
in public schools? How many conflicts have been reported in schools
attributable to the headscarf? In how many cases were the conflicts
provoked by the girls who were wearing the headscarf? In how many
231.
232.
233.
234.
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cases were the conflicts provoked by others against the girls? Are
there problems in private Catholic schools attended by Muslim girls
wearing the headscarf? How many girls have been prohibited from
entering school because of disruptions? To what extent have public
school officials tried to mediate conflicts? What mediation attempts
have succeeded and failed? Why? In how many cases did public
school officials ignore the guidance of the Conseil d’État and attempt
to prohibit the wearing of headscarves? In how many cases did
conflicts arise as a result of school officials attempting to ban
headscarves even though the Conseil d’État had guaranteed the
right? These and comparable questions should have been raised and
conscientiously answered by the Commission. Some of the evidence
that is available to help answer these questions—evidence which the
Commission did not cite—certainly suggests that the problems were
not only much less serious than the Commission would have its
readers believe, but that the problems were decreasing in
seriousness.235
At the time the Stasi Commission was appointed, it will be
recalled, no new dramatic or provocative cases regarding headscarves
in the schools had come to the public’s attention. As outlined
above,236 the Haut Conseil à l’Integration had found that the
guidance offered by the Conseil d’État appeared to be working, a
conclusion that was reaffirmed by the Traité de droit de religion
français, and the Education Ministry’s mediator had reported a fifty
percent reduction in problematic cases. No new troubling incidents
arising from schools led to the calling of the Stasi Commission. In
fact, the crisis of 2003 seems to have arisen not from particular
events, but from statements made by politicians that appealed to
latent popular sentiments. When these political developments are
235. For example, unofficial estimates, attributed to the Minister of the Interior and
published by the French media, have reported that there are 1,256 girls in public schools who
wear the headscarf. Of these, only twenty have been difficult cases, and only four girls have
been expelled. LE MONDE, Dec. 10, 2003, LEXIS (reporting on estimates made by Interior
Minister Sarkozy on November 20, 2003). Also, as described above, one very useful barometer
of the source of the problems at the local level can be inferred from the judgments of the
Conseil d’État. Of the forty-nine contested cases before it, forty-one were decided against
school administrators and only eight against the students and their families, HAUT CONSEIL À
L’INTÉGRATION, supra note 160, which certainly suggests that the provocateurs in most cases
were not the Muslims but those who were prejudiced against them. Furthermore, as described
in supra note 164, the relevant official from the Ministry of Education reported early in 2003
that the number of problematic cases had decreased by half. See also supra notes 161–63.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 160–161.
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considered in conjunction with underlying attitudes that are revealed
in public opinion polls, the first question that the Commission
should presumably have addressed was whether there was in fact a
serious problem caused by headscarves in public schools, or whether
there was only an apparent crisis that had been precipitated by
political figures pandering to popular prejudices. Nowhere does the
Commission Report consider the possibility that the headscarf crisis
of 2003 was due to a combination of popular prejudices, media
sensationalism, and exploitation by the political classes.
We can of course feel sympathy for local officials who probably
did feel many pressures with regard to the headscarf. But it must also
be recognized that the Commission, once again, never specified who
was placing pressure on local officials. The Stasi Report implies that
the pressure is coming from Muslims—but it does not say so clearly.
Of course we can assume that the sources of the pressure will likely
vary from one community to another, and we can well imagine the
possibility of beleaguered school officials feeling pressures from
multiple directions at the same time. But keeping in mind that
French law, at the time the Commission made its recommendations,
presumed that girls had the constitutional right to wear headscarves, we
can reasonably imagine that pressures came either from those who
opposed the law as articulated by the Conseil d’État (and who
impermissibly wished to ban headscarves), or from those who
believed that the official policy was not being followed by school
officials.237 These scenarios suggest that if there was undue pressure on
local officials, it was probably coming from those who were seeking to

237. This may well be the case. See MESSNER, supra note 35, at 1135–36 (discussing the
many efforts of national and local officials to circumvent the decisions of the Conseil d’État).
For further evidence, see supra note 235. The Stasi Commission, which demonstrated great
solicitude for the rights of French citizens who did not wish to wear headscarves, was
completely silent on the rights of the French citizens who were repeatedly denied their right to
wear them. Indeed, the Stasi Commission even implies that the wearing of headscarves—rather
than the constitutional violations—were the important issue. From public opinion polls and
social attitudes, it can well be imagined that the principal pressure on school officials came
from those who did not want scarves being worn in school, regardless of the decision of the
Conseil d’État. Of course this is to some extent speculative, and it is also probable that in some
cases it was the proponents of the headscarves who were provocative. Nevertheless, when the
Commission identified this issue as one basis for its recommendation, it should have specified
with great clarity the source of the unwarranted pressure. Failing to do so suggests either a lack
of intellectual rigor or an unwillingness to acknowledge popular prejudices against Muslims
and the headscarf. Again we can contrast the Commission’s criticism of those who pressure
girls to wear the headscarf and its silence regarding those who apply pressure to prevent it.
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ban headscarves in violation of existing French law. Once again, the
Commission could have avoided the troubling vagueness of its
assertions by accurately and objectively providing evidence to
identify the sources of the pressure on public officials. By failing to
identify exactly who was causing the pressure, the Stasi Commission
leaves the reader with the (apparently incorrect) impression that the
undue pressure on local officials came predominantly from those
who favored headscarves, rather than from those who wished to ban
them. It would indeed be a disservice to the rule of law if people
were able to place inappropriate pressure on school officials to ignore
the constitutional law articulated by the Conseil d’État, and then the
Stasi Commission were to respond by recommending a change in the
law to satisfy the very people who had acted against the law. This
resembles, of course, the Commission’s recommendation that Jewish
boys remove their skullcaps to reduce tensions caused by those who
dislike the sight of Jews wearing head coverings.
In addition to lamenting the pressures felt by local officials, the
Stasi Commission also asserted that local officials have had difficulty
applying the law as articulated by the Conseil d’État. But once again,
the Commission failed to identify even one example where the law
was unclear or confusing—certainly conveying the impression to the
outside reader that the Commission was more interested in
recommending the banning of headscarves than it was in providing
an intellectually respectable analysis of the situation. The
Commission relied ultimately not on facts and arguments, but on
inference and innuendo—all in support of prohibiting children from
making their own determinations about how they wish to honor
their God.
c. The nexus between undue social pressure to wear the headscarf
and the recommendation to prohibit headscarves in schools. Having
emphasized the problem of coercion behind the wearing of the
headscarf, the Commission recommended that religious and political
attire be prohibited from public schools. The discussion above
suggests that there were problems in how the Commission identified
and analyzed the issue of coercion. Let us temporarily assume that
the Commission was correct in identifying coercion against Muslim
girls as a serious problem, and in believing that this coercion harms
these girls by depriving them of full integration into the public
schools, by reducing their freedom of choice, and by forcing them
477
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into a sexist subcommunity where their rights as full human beings
are not respected. How well does the Commission’s
recommendation, which would ban headscarves from public schools,
respond to these problems?238
First, the Commission offers no evidence or argument that
banning headscarves in schools will reduce coercion on girls at home
or in their communities—which are the places that the Commission
identified as the source of the coercion. Second, and probably more
important, the Commission does not analyze or discuss the possible
counterproductive consequences of its recommendations. For
example, the fathers and brothers who force girls to wear headscarves
may apply even greater pressure and insults on them. This is exactly
the type of issue that a conscientious commission should have
considered and examined thoroughly—but such analysis is
completely lacking in the Stasi Report. If the Commission was
concerned that the girls were called “whores” if they did not wear
headscarves, why did it imagine that such insults will decrease if the
girls are forbidden to wear headscarves in schools? Would they not
be more likely to increase? What responses are likely to come from
the communities that pressure girls into headscarves and seclusion
once the girls cannot wear the headscarf at school? Will the girls be
sent to Islamic schools, and thereby be further separated from the
remainder of French society? Or will they perhaps be withdrawn
from education altogether? If the community pressure on these girls
is as intense as the Commission suggests, is not banning the
headscarf likely to exacerbate the very ills that the Commission
criticizes? And, on a more global basis, is it not possible that
attempts to ban the headscarf may ultimately polarize the French
population and raise even deeper antagonisms against Muslims and
women wearing headscarves outside schools?

238. It should be remembered that the Commission made many other recommendations,
and it is possible that these other recommendations might have ameliorated some of the
problems identified by the Commission. Thus, a defender of the Commission might respond
by saying that the recommended clothing ban should not be considered in isolation and that it
was never imagined to be the entire solution to the problem. Responses to such a defense,
even ones that acknowledge its reasonableness, could be that the Commission knew that the
headscarf was the issue of interest to the public and that this recommendation would likely be
seized in exclusion of the others, and that the Commission nevertheless had the obligation to
show that the ban would have positive results that would outweigh the negative consequences.
Even if we grant the (hypothetical) defense its due, the Commission nevertheless did not
attempt to address the nexus or the possible counterproductivity of its recommendation.
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The Commission began its analysis by using effusive language
praising laïcité, neutrality, equality, and freedom of conscience.
Although underscoring the importance of rights of conscience, the
Commission never troubled itself to identify exactly what rights of
religion and belief were even implicated in the issue of religious
clothing. Nowhere does the Commission acknowledge that some
human beings attach great importance as matters of conscience to
the wearing of religious clothing. And after failing to identify the
right that was implicated, the Commission relied on the public order
doctrine without having documented carefully the public order issue
that was implicated. Thus, the Stasi Report does not objectively
balance rights of conscience (which it never discusses as an issue of
concern) against public order (which it fails to describe in any
specific way). Rather, the Stasi Report uses the rhetoric of laïcité as a
sword to justify the banning of religious clothing and insignia. We
may predict, with confidence, that the future will show that the Stasi
Report did not analyze a conflict; it exacerbated one.
V. “UNDER GOD,” RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND DISSENTING
JUDGES IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Most Americans probably do not share the concerns of the
National Assembly, President Chirac, and the Stasi Commission
regarding religious attire in public schools. This does not mean,
however, that Americans are in any way indifferent to the role
religion plays in public schools. Americans link in their minds public
schools, the American flag, national values, and the declaration that
the United States is “one Nation under God.” Thus, public schools
play a role in the United States similar to that of public schools in
France.239 “Americans expect schools not only to help students reach
their potential as individuals but also to make them good citizens
who will maintain the nation’s values and institutions . . . and pass
them on to the next generation.”240 Education “is at the core of the
dominant American ideology.”241 Of course, when schools are
perceived as the locus of education for the next generation, they
necessarily become a battleground where the values are defined. “In

239. See supra discussion at IV.
240. JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1–2 (2003).
241. Id. at 19.
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the twentieth century, particularly in the United States, differing
groups have battled to ensure that their concepts of politics,
morality, and society are taught by the schools.”242 It would
probably be fair to say that during the last thirty years in the United
States, the two most heated ongoing constitutional conflicts are the
role of religion in public schools and abortion.243 It is not surprising
that the headscarf in France and “under God” in the United States
can generate so much passion and anxiety: they are at the
intersection of schools, values, religion, and national identity.
A. The Background of the American Flag and the Pledge of Allegiance
The flag of the United States is a pervasive symbol in national
ceremonies, political campaigns, schools, public buildings (federal,
state, and local), public parks, advertisements, sports activities, and
on church properties, businesses, homes, motor vehicles, sweatshirts
and lapels. Federal law establishes rules for proper care of and respect
for the flag.244 The American National Anthem is a song about the
flag, and it too is codified, despite its questionable associations.245
Since 1916, June 14 has been national Flag Day, which is now
codified in law.246 The official National March of the United States,

242. JOEL SPRING, THE AMERICAN SCHOOL 406 (1997).
243. Popular rhetoric frequently claims that the “Supreme Court has taken prayers and
the Bible out of school,” and some assert that a decline in American morals can be traced
directly to the Supreme Court decisions of Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and School
District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
244. 4 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3, 5–9 (2004).
245. 36 U.S.C. § 301 (2004). “The Star Spangled Banner” was written by Francis Scott
Key in 1814, but did not become the official National Anthem until 1931. The National
Anthem, which was adopted in the middle of prohibition, was written to the tune of an
eighteenth-century British drinking song that was popular in America at the time Key wrote
the lyrics. The drinking song, “To Anacreon in Heaven,” was written in 1780 as the club song
of the British Anacreontic Society, whose members were devoted to the cause of consuming
vast quantities of food and wine. The song itself praises the gods Bacchus, Venus, and Apollo.
Key’s patriotic words conclude:
And the Star Spangled Banner in Triumph shall wave
O’er the land of the free and the home of the brave!
“To Anacreon in Heaven” concludes with:
And long may the Sons of ANACREON intwine
The Myrtle of VENUS with BACCUS’S Vine.
Anacreon, to whose memory the song was dedicated, was a sixth-century B.C. poet whose
verses praised wine and physical love (both homosexual and heterosexual). See THE OXFORD
CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 79–80 (Simon Hornblower & Antony Spawforth eds., 3d ed. 1996).
246. 36 U.S.C. § 110 (2004).
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the “Stars and Stripes Forever,” also is dedicated to the flag.247 The
most famous American monument from World War II, the Iwo Jima
Memorial, commemorates the raising of the American flag on
Mount Suribachi. The United States has a pledge of allegiance to a
flag, which also is a federal law.248 Public schools across the United
States begin the school day with students and teachers jointly
reciting the federal Pledge in accordance with state laws and
policies.249 In 1988, the Pledge of Allegiance became a subject of
dispute in the presidential campaign when Republican candidate
George H.W. Bush criticized Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis
for having vetoed a Massachusetts Pledge of Allegiance law.250
Although the American flag is now a pervasive symbol inside the
United States, this was not always the case. In fact, it is possible to
specify with relative precision the ten-year period, from 1888 to
1898, when the flag moved from playing a modest background part
on the national stage to filling the transcendant role that it plays
today.251 Prior to 1888, the flag typically appeared only on military
bases, ships at sea, and some federal buildings.252 But only one

247. Id. § 304 (2004).
248. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2004). For the text of the law, see supra note 7. The U.S. Code
contains no requirements that schools lead children in reciting the Pledge—this being left to
state law.
249. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 312.
250. During the 1988 campaign, one journalist wrote:
“What is it about the Pledge of Allegiance that upsets [candidate Dukakis] so
much?” Bush regularly asks in his stump speech, implying that perhaps Dukakis’
allegiance itself is suspect.
....
. . . Bush will not say it openly, but he is sending the message that the
Democrats and their standard-bearer are disloyal. If it was not having a significant
effect on the electorate, the Bush campaign would not keep doing it.
William M. LeoGrande, The Pledge Issue Is No Joke, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1988, at 7.
251. The history of the United States flag of course goes back at least to the 1770s. It
became a popular symbol in times of war, but generally faded during more peaceful periods.
Between the Civil War and 1888 there had been a bout of enthusiasm in conjunction with the
one-hundredth anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1876, and
many mythic stories about the flag’s origin were widely circulated at the time in popular
literature. See generally SCOT M. GUENTER, THE AMERICAN FLAG, 1777–1924: CULTURAL
SHIFTS FROM CREATION TO CODIFICATION (1990). Terms that are often used to describe
such attitudes are “the cult of the flag” and “flag mania”—which are sometimes embraced
enthusiastically and sometimes rejected as pejoratives. Id. at 103, 111, 118, 124, 131.
252. Stuart McConnell, Reading the Flag: A Reconsideration of the Patriotic Cults of the
1890s, in BONDS OF AFFECTION: AMERICANS DEFINE THEIR PATRIOTISM 102–03, 107 (John
Bodnar ed., 1996).
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decade later, the American flag had become a ubiquitous symbol of
the United States that was thoroughly integrated into American
popular culture, commercial advertising, political campaigns, and
patriotism. Whereas before 1888 flags were rarely displayed at public
schools, by 1898 most schools had flagpoles and children started the
school day by reciting a pledge of allegiance to the flag. In 1898,
New York became the first of many states (later to be followed by
the federal government) to enact laws prescribing flag rituals. The
latter year also was notable for the first publication of John Philip
Sousa’s popular marching song “The Stars and Stripes Forever.”253
Of course, 1898 is also notable as the year that the United States
launched its most blatant foray into international imperialism, which
resulted in its flag being hoisted over Cuba, Hawaii, Wake Island,
Guam, and the Philippines.254 The year 1898 also heard the delivery
253. The tune was written on Christmas Day, 1896. E.T. Paull’s “We’ll Stand by the
Flag,” another popular song and march, also was published in 1898.
254. New York’s law requiring schools to establish flag ceremonies was enacted on March
28, 1898, the day before the United States issued an ultimatum to the Spanish government to
terminate its presence in Cuba. GUENTER, supra note 251, at 229 n.45. Depending upon
one’s political and historical judgment, the history of the United States might be described as
an almost uninterrupted continuation of imperialistic endeavors—from the conquest of Native
Americans, to the Spanish in Florida, or to the Mexicans in Texas—until America’s “manifest
destiny” had reached the west coast. American conquests then continued, in this line of
reasoning, to the Panama Canal, to Cuba, to Puerto Rico, and then finally to the Philippines
and other Pacific islands. Such imperialism then sought outlets through the projection of
global military and economic power. Though most Americans probably do not perceive the
history of their land in such imperialistic terms, the one period where the United States in fact
boasted unequivocally of its imperialistic ambitions and military power was during the 1890s,
at exactly the same time of the dramatic increase in flag ceremonies and celebrations. Among
the dozens of books on American imperialism during this period, two of the classics are
WALTER LAFEBER, THE NEW EMPIRE: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN EXPANSION 1860–
1898 (1963) and ERNEST R. MAY, IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY: THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICA AS
A GREAT POWER (1973). The most influential book of the epoch was published in 1890.
ALFRED THAYER MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY 1660–1783
(1890). Mahan’s subsequent book appeared in 1897. ALFRED THAYER MAHAN, THE
INTEREST OF AMERICA IN SEA POWER, PRESENT AND FUTURE (1897).
For the circumstances leading up to the war, see MAY, supra, at 133–59. Much of the
clergy and business community were opposed to the war. Those who most favored the war
spoke in the language of jingoism and flag triumphalism. “Across the country, thousands gave
themselves up to emotional excesses like those of tent-meeting revivals. Theater audiences
cheered, stamped, and wept at the playing of the Star-Spangled Banner.” Id. at 142. Some of
the fervor was distinctly anti-Catholic. Id. at 142–43.
The war lasted only 100 days. On May 1, 1898, the U.S. Navy destroyed the Spanish
fleet based in Manila Bay. On August 12, 1898, the United States ordered Spain to evacuate
Cuba, cede Puerto Rico and Guam, and allow American occupation of Manila. On the same
day it annexed Hawaii. Although the United States had ostensibly challenged Spain in the
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of one of the most famous political speeches of the century—Senator
Albert J. Beveridge’s “March of the Flag,” which praised the military
conquests of that year and urged that the imperialistic spirit
continue. “Fellow Americans, we are God’s chosen people. . . . His
great purposes are revealed in the progress of the flag . . . .”255
There are several interrelated reasons why the “cult of the flag”
developed in the decade leading up to the Spanish-American War.
The first of the three factors was the active campaigning by civic
societies in promoting the flag, with the most important being the
Civil War veterans association, the Grand Army of the Republic
(GAR). The GAR donated flags, proposed laws requiring the flying
of flags above schools, and urged churches to fly the flag.256
Philippines in order to support the indigenous rebels who had declared their independence,
the United States ultimately decided that it would be best for the Filipinos if it were to take
military control of all of the islands. When the rebels continued their struggle for
independence, this time against the United States, troops were sent to crush the independence
uprising. The United States agreed to Filipino independence only in 1935. The U.S. Naval
Station at Guantanamo, Cuba, is a relic of this imperialistic era. Though the United States’
declaration of war had pledged it would not exercise sovereignty over Cuba, it imposed the socalled Platt Amendment on Cuban officials, who were forced to accept it as a condition of
American military withdrawal from the island. In conjunction with the forced Platt
Amendment, the two countries “agreed” to lease the Guantanamo station to the United
States. To this day, the United States sends to Cuba a check for the nominal rent of the
equivalent of 2,000 gold coins for the lease. The Cuban government does not recognize
American de jure right and does not cash the check.
255. Albert J. Beveridge, The March of the Flag, in 14 THE LIBRARY OF ORATORY 426
(Chauncy M. Depew ed., 1902). “William McKinley plants the flag over the islands of the seas,
outposts of commerce, citadels of national security, and the march of the flag goes on!” Id. at
438. “Ah! as our commerce spreads, the flag of liberty will circle the globe, and the highways
of the ocean—carrying trade of all mankind, be guarded by the guns of the republic. And, as
their thunders salute the flag, benighted peoples will know that the voice of Liberty is
speaking, at last, for them.” Id. at 445. The rhetoric of Sentor Beveridge echoes that of our
own day. “Wherever we carry it, the American flag will stand not only for our power, but for
freedom. (Applause.) Our nation’s cause has always been larger than our nation’s defense. We
fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors human liberty.” George W. Bush,
Remarks at Graduation Ceremony at West Point Military Academy, June 1, 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html (last visited May
15, 2004).
256. See McConnell, supra note 252, at 102–19; GUENTER, supra note 251, at 104–07;
ELLEN M. LITWICKI, AMERICA’S PUBLIC HOLIDAYS 1865–1920 177–80 (2000). Other
organizations such as the Daughters of the American Revolution were engaged in similar
activities. Id. 107–11; see also MARY R. DEARING, VETERANS IN POLITICS: THE STORY OF THE
G.A.R. 405–07 (1952). The Grand Army of the Republic actively supported the efforts of
Colonel Balch and The Youth’s Companion. Id. at 474–75; see also infra text accompanying
notes 257–79. It also was during this period that the Grand Army of the Republic began its
campaign, in conjunction with patriotic ceremonies, to include military instruction in public
schools. Id. at 476–77; STUART MCCONNELL, GLORIOUS CONTENTMENT: THE GRAND
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The second stimulus sparking interest in the flag between 1888
and 1898 was a Civil War veteran, Colonel George T. Balch, who
launched a program of patriotic rituals in public schools in New York
City.257 Colonel Balch, who shared prejudices against immigrants
that were typical of the time, believed that a carefully prescribed flag
ceremony could be useful in molding the minds of the tainted
immigrants.258 He prescribed elaborate flag rituals with exacting
specification for flag sizes, the material of which they should be
made, the wood for their staffs (e.g., “best white ash, oil polished”
for primary schools), and decorative eagles to ride astride the
poles.259 He developed patriotic exercises for schools, including what
is probably the first official salute and pledge. Balch wrote a patriotic
catechism for students to memorize. The response to the question
regarding “what do we mean by the salutation of the Flag?” was as
follows:
Hence we have been taught to say—as we touch, first our
foreheads, and next our hearts— “WE GIVE OUR HEADS!—AND
OUR HEARTS!—TO GOD! AND OUR COUNTRY!” . . . [T]he
American principles, the American language and the American Flag
SHOULD BE SUPREME OVER ALL OTHERS, and so we complete our

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC, 1865–1900, at 230–31(1992); CECILIA ELIZABETH O’LEARY, TO
DIE FOR: THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN PATRIOTISM 181–84 (1999).
257. For more regarding Balch, see GUENTER, supra note 251, at 114–20; LITWICKI,
supra note 256, at 179; O’LEARY, supra note 256, at 151–55. While working as the auditor of
New York City’s public schools in 1888, Balch observed a teacher and students conducting a
small patriotic ceremony in a classroom. In this small ceremony, he saw “the germ of a
patriotic movement” that, if properly implemented, would have “far reaching consequences of
which it would be impossible to prognosticate at this time.” GEORGE T. BALCH, METHODS OF
TEACHING PATRIOTISM IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS xii (1890) [hereinafter METHODS OF
TEACHING]. Balch began giving speeches on the topic in 1889, published his book on it the
following year, and spent the remainder of his life promoting the flag and patriotic exercises.
258. Balch apparently believed that immigrants had inherited subservient world views. He
lamented American nineteenth-century policies that had allowed the immigration
of fifteen millions of aliens, speaking more than forty distinct languages and dialects
other than the English; a vast number of whom bear in their physical and mental
features the indelible impress of centuries of monarchical or aristocratic rule and
oppression, and who have been trained to an implicit belief in and reverence for
ecclesiastical institutions which find no place in our form of government [and which
have] diluted our civilization.
METHODS OF TEACHING, supra note 257, at viii.
259. Id. at 39–41.
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salute with the words, “ONE COUNTRY!—ONE LANGUAGE!—ONE
FLAG!”260

Balch devoted the last five years of his life to promoting flag
ceremonies in New York City schools—with the goal of establishing
an “era of good feeling in the whole community.”261
The third, and probably the most influential effort to promote
flags, salutes, and pledges in schools came from the popular
publication The Youth’s Companion.262 By the late 1880s, this
weekly, published in Boston, had been in existence for almost fifty
years and had perhaps the highest circulation of any magazine in the
United States, with a distribution approaching 500,000 copies per
issue.263 The Youth’s Companion initially rejected the ritualized flag
ceremonies promoted by Colonel Balch. Although not referring to
him by name, it squarely targeted him in an August 29, 1889,
editorial entitled “Teaching Patriotism” (the same title as Balch’s
lecture and forthcoming book).264 The editorial criticized the flag
rituals advocated by the “gentleman of New York” because they
were more appropriate for military posts and ships at sea than for
children in school. Rather than following meaningless ceremonies,
the magazine suggested that children would better appreciate their
country by understanding its history. The youth are less captivated
by ceremonies than historical examples “related in detail, with
simplicity and truth.”265 During the next few months, however, this
initial editorial position would change dramatically.
The Youth’s Companion, in addition to publishing adventure
stories, poems, and amusing anecdotes, was also a pioneer in what
later became the mail-order catalogue business.266 It operated its own
in-house Premium Department that offered a wide range of items as
bonuses to people who enlisted new subscribers, but it also made the
products available for direct purchase. A few years before Sears,
260. GEORGE T. BALCH, PATRIOTIC PRIMER FOR THE LITTLE CITIZEN 16 (3d ed. rev.
enlarged 1898).
261. METHODS OF TEACHING, supra note 257, at 43.
262. See GUENTER, supra note 251, at 114–32; JOHN W. BAER, THE PLEDGE OF
ALLEGIANCE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY, 1892–1992 (1992), http://history.vineyard.net/
pdgech0.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2004); LITWICKI, supra note 256, at 175–76; O’LEARY,
supra note 256, at 155–71.
263. GUENTER, supra note 251, at 120; BAER, supra note 262, ch. 2.
264. THE YOUTH’S COMPANION, Aug. 29, 1889, at 429.
265. Id.
266. See GUENTER, supra note 251, at 125; O’LEARY, supra note 256, at 155–57.
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Roebuck and Company issued its first catalogue in 1893, the
Premium Department was already in the business of advertising and
selling books, clothing, stamp albums, microscopes, toys, pocket
knives—and American flags. In 1888, the enterprising head of the
Premium Department, James B. Upham, had the innovative idea to
promote simultaneously American patriotism and magazine profits.
In that year, the Premium Department launched its “School Flag
Movement,” which ultimately became a campaign to place flags in
every public school in the United States—flags that the Premium
Department was pleased to sell to schools and individuals.267 In
January 1890, it launched a nationwide essay competition for
students to write about the flag.268 The Youth’s Companion promised
to donate a flag to the school of the winner of the competition in
each state. The July fourth issue in 1890 was entitled “Raising the
School House Flag,” and it included drawings, poems, essays, and
the names of the winners of the competition.269 The magazine
sponsored additional competitions, published articles on poems on
the flag, distributed poems that could be framed, and launched
campaigns to stimulate both purchases and patriotism by sending to
schools packets of “100 certificates” that students could sell to
people in the community.270 After 100 certificates had been sold for
ten cents each, the ten-dollar purchase price was to be forwarded to
the Premium Department, which would, in turn, send a flag to the
school. The school would receive a flag, the people in the
community would have a small certificate noting their patriotic
contribution, and the magazine would make a profit. This
entrepreneurial patriotism was wildly successful, with the magazine
ultimately taking credit for sending more than 26,000 flags to
schools.271
Whereas the magazine had previously asserted that Colonel
Balch’s military-style flag ritualism was inappropriate for
schoolchildren rather than the preferred patriotic education and
cultivation of feelings, the magazine reversed course and wholeheartedly embraced flag ceremonies, saluting, and pledges. The
pinnacle of the effort to formalize flag ceremonies came in 1892.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
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The magazine engaged in a year-long effort to sponsor a nationwide
flag ceremony to coincide with the opening of the Chicago world’s
fair—the Columbian Exposition of 1892.272 The Premium
Department appointed a staff writer, Francis Bellamy, to assume
responsibility for promoting the event. The latter, formerly a Baptist
preacher, was a Christian Socialist and the cousin of the soon-to-be
famous utopian writer, Edward Bellamy.273 Francis was able to obtain
endorsements from President Benjamin Harrison and his Democratic
challenger, Grover Cleveland. Bellamy’s home-state senator, Henry
Cabot Lodge, arranged for a meeting with President Harrison that
resulted in a presidential proclamation endorsing the Columbus Day
activity. A fiercely divided Congress united for the bipartisan purpose
of making Columbus Day a national holiday.274 The September 8,
1892, issue of The Youth’s Companion included the outline of “The
Official Programme” for the combined national ceremonies that
would start precisely at 9:00 a.m. in Chicago and in schools
throughout the country.275 The third item on the agenda was a
“salute to the flag,” which contains the first version of what would
later become the official Pledge of Allegiance.

272. GUENTER, supra note 251, at, 124–31; O’LEARY, supra note 256, at 161–71. The
exposition, with exhibits from countries throughout the world, commemorated the 400th
anniversary of the arrival of Christopher Columbus in the Western hemisphere.
273. For more regarding Bellamy’s Christian Socialist background and his patriotism
work at The Youth’s Companion, see BAER, supra note 262, ch. 4. Bellamy had been a Baptist
preacher for eleven years before he was forced to resign for having unorthodox theological
views. He was then hired by The Youth’s Companion. O’LEARY, supra note 256, at 157.
274. LITWICKI, supra note 256, at 175; O’LEARY, supra note 256, at 165. After
trumpeting their presidential and congressional endorsements, the magazine attempted to
explain the rationale for tying Christopher Columbus to a ceremony celebrating the United
States flag in schoolhouses across the country. In what may be taken as not altogether
compelling logic, the magazine explained:
Columbus stood in his age as the pioneer of progress and enlightenment. The
system of universal education is, in our age, the most prominent and salutary feature
of the spirit of enlightenment, and it is particularly appropriate that the schools be
made the centre of the day’s demonstration. To Americans, therefore, it seems
logical and proper that the celebration of the discovery which made our republic
possible should centre about the schoolhouse flag.
THE YOUTH’S COMPANION, Aug. 18, 1892, at 412. Whether or not the connection between
Columbus, public schools, and the American flag is obvious to the modern reader, it seems to
have been taken at face value in the 1890s. See O’LEARY, supra note 256, at 166.
275. This issue also advertised the sale of the full four-page program, including the
speeches, which could be purchased in bulk quantities directly from the magazine.
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At a signal from the Principal the pupils, in ordered ranks, hands to
the side, face the Flag. Another signal is given; every pupil gives the
Flag the military salute—right hand lifted, palm downward, to a
line with their forehead and close to it. Standing thus, all repeat
together, slowly: “I pledge allegiance to my Flag and the Republic
for which it stands: one Nation indivisible, with Liberty and Justice
for All.” At the words “to my Flag,” the right hand is extended
gracefully, palm upward, towards the Flag—and remains in this
gesture till the end of the affirmation.276

In addition to launching the Pledge, these instructions also launched
the straight-arm salute that had been made famous in the French
Revolution and that would be the preferred means for children to
salute the flag through at least the 1930s.277 The Columbus Day
celebration was wildly successful. Almost every governor in the
United States endorsed the day’s activities and more than half of the
public schools in the United States promised to participate—
meaning that millions of children participated in what was at that
point the largest national ceremony in the history of the United
States.278 In New York City alone, 10,500 pupils participated in a

276. THE YOUTH’S COMPANION, Sept. 8, 1892, at 446.
277. By promoting the straight-arm gesture (though palm up), The Youth’s Companion
used essentially the same gesture as that popularized by David and the French revolutionaries a
century earlier. See supra note 53 (discussing David and the two oath artworks). By 1899, the
Grand Army of the Republic endorsed The Youth’s Companion straight-arm salute, along with
both its pledge and that of Colonel Balch. DEARING, supra note 256, at 475. For the next fifty
years, children throughout the United States pledged allegiance to the flag using the straightarm gesture. By the early 1940s, as Americans became increasingly uncomfortable with its
resemblance to the Nazi straight-arm salute, it was abandoned in favor of a bent-arm with the
right hand placed over the heart.
As discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 135 and 136, the Jehovah’s
Witnesses objected to state policies mandating recitation of the Pledge by schoolchildren, and
suffered the consequences of popular violence against their religious beliefs. The Supreme
Court noted in a Jehovah’s Witness case that whereas West Virginia school officials had
accommodated objections by some parents to the stiff-arm salute because it was “too much
like Hitler’s,” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 627 (1943), they made no
comparable effort to accommodate Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious objections to pledging
allegiance to a flag before expelling them. Id. The National Headquarters of the United States
Flag Association unsuccessfully argued that the stiff-arm salute was not like Hitler’s because the
American salute had the palm up whereas Hitler’s was palm down. Id. at n.3. Later efforts were
instigated to revive the straight-arm gesture. The Senate adopted an amendment to the Pledge
of Allegiance law in 1954 that would have returned the straight-arm salute, but Congress
ultimately adopted the House version, which opted for the placement of the hand over the
heart. See also GUENTER, supra note 251, at 119.
278. O’LEARY, supra note 256, at 167–68.
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march commemorating the day.279 Shortly after the Columbian
Exposition, The Youth’s Companion began to advocate the
enactment of state laws mandating flag ceremonies at schools and
became a national clearinghouse for legislation on flag laws.280 The
first statute was adopted by the state of New York in 1898, and
legislatures and school boards joined the bandwagon during the
following years.281
In the United States, as was the case in France during the
Revolution, it was the people who had conscientious scruples against
pledges and oaths who first felt the brunt of state measures to
require declarations of loyalty and who ultimately became the victims
of popular violence that punished those who refused. “Religious
opposition to the flag-salute ceremony probably is as old as the
ceremony itself.”282 As early as 1918, small religious groups that
opposed pledging allegiance to the flag became the victims of both
legal and extra-legal attacks. Some Mennonites, Jehovites, members
of the Elijah Voice Society, and members of the Church of God
refused to comply with the Pledge because they believed it was
idolatrous. They felt the force of popular opposition and the law.283
The records of the attacks against these groups were not fully
documented in part because there were few legal remedies available.
There was no effective federal law or recognized constitutional right
that could be used to obtain protection either against state officials
for prosecuting religious dissenters or for failing to protect religious
dissenters against mob violence.284
The group that suffered most famously for its conscientious
objection to pledging the flag was the Jehovah’s Witnesses. They
suffered harassment for refusing to pledge throughout the 1930s.285
The Civil Rights Section of the Justice Department, shortly after
coming into existence in 1939, started keeping records on
279. See DEARING, supra note 256, at 407.
280. GUENTER, supra note 251, at 124; see also BAER, supra note 262, at ch. 2.
281. For further discussion of the subsequent development of flag laws, see DAVID R.
MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG-SALUTE CONTROVERSY 3–5 (1962).
282. Id. at 11.
283. Id. at 15.
284. Federal criminal statutes at the time, 18 U.S.C. §§ 51–52, were not effective in part
because they protected only recognized federal constitutional rights. The Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment was not incorporated until 1940 in the Cantwell v. Connecticut
decision, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was still far in the future.
285. MANWARING, supra note 281, passim.
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harassment against Jehovah’s Witnesses. David Manwaring, who was
provided access to the Justice Department files, describes dozens of
the attacks. On June 1, 1940, seventy Witnesses were taken into
“protective custody” by the Odessa, Texas, police to prevent them
from being attacked by a crowd. The prisoners were questioned
throughout the night about their unwillingness to say the Pledge.
The next morning “all seventy were turned over to a mob of over a
thousand who chased and stoned them five miles down the railroad
right of way.”286 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court handed
down the Gobitis decision, which held that the federal Constitution
provided no religious freedom right to prevent state officials from
expelling students who refused to recite the patriotic Pledge.287
Following that decision, a wave of violence against the Witnesses
occurred throughout the United States. The number of attacks was
so serious that the chief of the civil rights section of the Department
of Justice, Victor W. Rotnem, published an article to draw attention
to the problem. “In the two years following the [Gobitis] decision,
the files of the Department of Justice reflect an uninterrupted record
of violence and persecution of the [Jehovah’s] Witnesses. Almost
without exception, the flag and the flag salute can be found as the
percussion cap that sets off these acts.”288 The people committing
these violent acts, Rotnem reported, did so to manifest their
patriotism and support of the cherished American flag. “The flag has
been used in a manner bordering on immorality by mobs which have
bated groups of Jehovah’s Witnesses throughout the country.”289
When people saw Jehovah’s Witnesses on the streets, they would
demand that they recite the patriotic Pledge. Violence often followed
the refusal.
The most spectacular early outbreak occurred in York County,
Maine. Two Witnesses were beaten in Sanford on June 8, when
they refused to salute. The following day, in Kennebunk, a carload
of men conveniently equipped with throwing-size rocks “just
happened to stop” in front of the Jehovah’s Witness Kingdom Hall
. . . . The Witnesses, already jittery from a fortnight of tension,
greeted the visitors with shotgun fire, seriously wounding one. Six
286. Id. at 164.
287. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
288. Victor W. Rotnem & F.G. Folson, Jr., Recent Restrictions Upon Religious Liberty, 36
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1053, 1062 (1942).
289. Id.
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Witnesses were arrested for attempted murder. In the meantime, an
enraged mob of 2,500, failing to reach the prisoners, sacked and
burned the Kingdom Hall, then drifted over to Biddeford to attack
houses suspected of containing Witnesses.290

Absurd rumors began to circulate in the United States that Jehovah’s
Witnesses had pictures of Adolf Hitler in their homes and Kingdom
Halls. Though Jehovah’s Witnesses were in fact being persecuted in
Nazi Germany for their refusal to pledge loyalty to Hitler, this seems
to have escaped the notice of the patriotic crowds who persecuted
them for refusing to pledge loyalty to the flag.
Other violence followed thick and fast. On June 16, the whole
adult population of Litchfield, Illinois, turned out to attack sixty
Jehovah’s Witnesses. Litchfield police, unable to control the mob,
put the Witnesses in jail, then called in the state police to protect
the jail. Of the Witnesses’ nineteen cars, sixteen were over turned
and three driven into the city reservoir.291

In Nebraska, a Jehovah’s Witness was pulled from his house and
castrated.292 In Little Rock, Arkansas, a group of workers armed
“with guns, pipes and screwdrivers . . . mercilessly beat all the
Witnesses they could find”; two Witnesses were shot and four others
hospitalized.293 All too often, police and other officials supported the
mobs rather than the victims.294 Just as laws and violence in France
punished nonjuring priests during the French Revolution, laws and
popular violence in the United States punished nonpledging
Jehovah’s Witnesses.295 Violence became an extralegal punishment
for those whose convictions did not permit them to make the
patriotic gesture. Fortunately, much of the violence against the
Witnesses declined after the Barnette decision of 1943—which spoke
generously of rights of conscience and the right not to pledge
allegiance to the flag.
The rise of the flag as the dominant national symbol thus began
with enthusiastic patriotic sentiments, but was quickly transformed

290. MANWARING, supra note 281, at 164–65.
291. Id. at 165.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 165–66.
294. Id.
295. It was not until the Barnette decision that states were prevented from punishing
those who refused to pledge. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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into formalized ceremonies, followed by legal codification. Those
who had religious scruples against reciting the words in unison while
making the straight-arm salute were branded as unpatriotic. Children
were expelled from schools, and adults were arrested and physically
attacked by mobs.
So what could be more American than adopting a pledge to a
flag that was written by a Christian Socialist, repeated while making
the straight-arm loyalty salute (revived by French revolutionaries),
and enforced by laws and popular violence? The answer, of course, is
adding “God” to the mixture.296 Following World War II, Americans
became increasingly anxious about godless communism behind the
iron curtain that had descended across Europe. The fall of
Nationalist China to the Communists in 1949, and the uncovering
of traitors in the early 1950s, increased the fears of the spread of
communism. The author of the first bill to add “under God” to the
Pledge of Allegiance, in arguing for an amendment to the law,
declared:
Free nations today battle for their very existence in many parts of
the world. Communism with its siren voice of false appeal is heard
round the world and many peoples and many nations fall prey to
those false headlights on the shores of time. One thing separates
free peoples of the Western World from the rabid Communist, and
this one thing is a belief in God.297

In 1950, Joseph McCarthy launched his famous campaign against
Communist infiltration of the United States government. The
following year, the Knights of Columbus, the conservative Catholic
lay organization that supported McCarthy, began a campaign to
insert the words “under God” in the official Pledge of Allegiance.298

296. For earlier attempts to declare that the United States was not merely “under God,”
but in fact “a Christian nation,” see GAINES M. FOSTER, A CHRISTIAN NATION: SIGNS OF A
COVENANT IN BONDS OF AFFECTION: AMERICANS DEFINE THEIR PATRIOTISM 120–38 (John
Bodnar ed., 1996); ROBERT T. HANDY, UNDERMINED ESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS IN AMERICA 1880–1920, at 10–15 (1991). For descriptions of how the words
“under God” were added to the pledge, see MARTIN E. MARTY, 3 MODERN AMERICAN
RELIGION 298–301 (1996); MARK SILK, SPIRITUAL POLITICS: RELIGION AND AMERICA
SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 97 (1988).
297. 100 CONG. REC. H7758 (1954) (statement of Rep. Rabaut, the sponsor of the first
bill in the eighty-third Congress to add “under God” to the Pledge).
298. Senator Joseph McCarthy was a member of the Knights of Columbus. Father
Donald Crosby, S.J., refers to the Knights of Columbus and the Catholic War Veterans as
“two of the staunchest pro-McCarthy groups in American Catholicism.” DONALD F. CROSBY,
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Following the Knights’ campaign, the next decisive boost came on
February 8, 1954, in a Sunday sermon delivered by the Reverend
Joseph Docherty to a congregation that included President Dwight
Eisenhower. Docherty lamented that the American Pledge of
Allegiance, as it was then formulated, had nothing specifically
American in it and could be recited verbatim by little “Muscovites.”
But if the words “one Nation under God” were part of the Pledge, it
would illustrate how the United States differed from its Soviet foe.
President Eisenhower praised the sermon and immediately agreed
that it would be a good idea to make the addition. Several bills were
introduced immediately afterward.299
At exactly the same time that the congressional debates regarding
God and the Pledge were taking place, Senator McCarthy, as
chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, was
conducting hearings regarding the infiltration of Communists in the
Army.300 Concurrently, the public began a letter-writing campaign to
Congress, not on the dangers of Communist spies or the abuses of
civil liberties, but on adding “under God” to the Pledge.
Congressman O’Hara of Illinois, for example, noted that he had
received between 2,000 and 3,000 letters in support of the addition.
“It was by far the largest mail that I have received on any subject
during the months of the 83rd Congress. It reflected a spiritual
awakening in our country the universality and the depth of which
may never have been surpassed.”301 There was an “avalanche” of mail
in support of the pledge. “At the very moment when Senator
McCarthy’s assault on the U.S. Army was grabbing the headlines and

GOD, CHURCH, AND FLAG: SENATOR JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH,
1950–1957, 221 (1978). Crosby notes that the Knights continued their support for McCarthy
even after his death, at a time when most Americans had come to regard him as a bully. Id. at
222–23. The Knights’ official publication, Columbia, praised McCarthy—both in life and after
his death—and denounced his critics. Id. at 223; see also CHRISTOPHER J. KAUFFMAN, FAITH
AND FRATERNALISM: THE HISTORY OF THE KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS 380–85 (rev. ed. 1992).
Kauffman, who is more sympathetic to the Knights than Father Crosby, nevertheless notes that
“articles in Columbia and resolutions of the Supreme Council indicate the Knights’ support of
McCarthy’s Senate hearings, and their defense of him against his detractors.” CHRISTOPHER J.
KAUFFMAN, PATRIOTISM AND FRATERNALISM IN THE KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS: A HISTORY
OF THE FOURTH DEGREE 111 (2001).
299. One bill, by Congressman Rabaut, had actually been introduced earlier in the
Congressional session. 100 CONG. REC. H7758 (1954) (statement by Rep. Rabaut).
300. McCarthy never found a Communist spy. TED MORGAN, REDS: MCCARTHYISM IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 448, 465, 508 (2003).
301. 100 CONG. REC. S7761 (1954).
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filling the television screens, the issue that seemed to touch
Americans most closely was the inclusion of God in the Pledge of
Allegiance.”302
The short Senate Report on the proposed law, whose length was
less than two-thirds of a page of the Congressional Record, consisted
almost entirely of a letter written by Senator Homer Ferguson. The
Senate Report (i.e., the Ferguson letter) asserted that “one of the
greatest differences between the free world and the Communists [is]
a belief in God,” and thus adding the two words to the Pledge “will
enable us to strike a blow against those who would enslave us.”303
The House Report, which also asserted that the United States would
be more secure against its enemies if it added “under God” to the
Pledge,304 offered an additional religious justification:
Our American Government is founded on the concept of the
individuality and the dignity of the human being. Underlying this
concept is the belief that the human person is important because he
was created by God and endowed by Him with certain inalienable
rights which no civil authority may usurp. The inclusion of God in
our pledge therefore would further acknowledge the dependence of
our people and our Government upon the moral directions of the
Creator.305

Congressman Rabaut, the chief sponsor in the House of
Representatives, testified that the two-word addition would help the
American people “be more alerted to the true meaning of our
country and its form of government.”306 Congressman O’Hara
declared that “what we are engaged in today is a sacred mission.”307
Democratic Congressman Peter Rodino appealed to the Christian
military tradition: “Since the days of Constantine and his standard,
‘In this sign thou shalt conquer,’ nations and governments have
relied for their strength on trust in God, and, in peace and war, have
placed their confidence in a resolution to do His will.”308 Although
both the Senate and House Reports cite the Mayflower Compact as
the earliest example of a divinely led America, their modern
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
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SILK, supra note 296, at 97.
S. REP. NO. 83-1287 (1954), reprinted in 100 CONG. REC. 6348.
H.R. REP. NO. 83-1693 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N 2339.
Id. at 2340.
Id. at 2341.
100 CONG. REC. 7762 (1954).
100 CONG. REC. 7763 (1954).
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understanding of religion was not the prophetic religion of the
Puritans where God calls the people to repentance, but a selfsatisfied religion that linked flag, country, Constitution, people,
God, and pledge: “Since our flag is symbolic of our nation, its
constitutional government and the morality of our people, the
committee believes it most appropriate that the concept of God be
included in the recitations of the pledge of allegiance to the flag.”309
President Eisenhower said, in his signing statement:
From this day forward, the millions of our school children will daily
proclaim in every city and town, every village and rural
schoolhouse, the dedication of our nation and our people to the
Almighty. To anyone who truly loves America, nothing could be more
inspiring than to contemplate this rededication of our youth, on
each school morning, to our country’s true heritage.310

Thus the flag, the Pledge, God, and country had all been united—
and those who truly loved America would connect all in their minds.
Following the legislative enactment, several members of Congress
went outside to the Capitol steps and pledged allegiance to “one
Nation under God” while CBS broadcast the event on television.311
B. The Newdow Case and the Ninth Circuit Dissenters
In March 2000, Michael Newdow, a medical doctor and the
father of a public school student in California, filed a lawsuit in
federal court in California alleging that the reference in the Pledge of
Allegiance to “under God,” as well as California law requiring
teachers to lead the recitation of the Pledge in public schools,

309. Id. Will Herberg, writing in 1960, suggested that religion, as American citizens
understand it,
is not something that makes for humility or the uneasy conscience; it is something
that reassures him about the essential rightness of everything American, his nation,
his culture, and himself; something that validates his goals and his ideals instead of
calling them into question; something that enhances his self-regard instead of
challenging it; something that feeds his self-sufficiency instead of shattering it;
something that offers him salvation on easy terms instead of demanding repentance
and a “broken heart.”
WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT — CATHOLIC — JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
SOCIOLOGY 269 (new ed. rev. 1960).
310. 100 CONG. REC. 8618 (1954) (signing statement by President Eisenhower)
(emphasis added).
311. SILK, supra note 296, at 98.
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violates the U.S. Constitution.312 As noted at the beginning of this
Article,313 a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit (Newdow I) held that
the phrase “under God” in the federal Pledge violated the
Establishment Clause, as did the California practice of leading
schoolchildren in reciting the Pledge. The response to the decision
was immediate and harsh. President Bush called the decision
“ridiculous,”314 and the Senate Majority Leader called it “nuts.”315
Senator Byrd, who prides himself on being the Senate’s
constitutional authority, said that a judge making such a decision is
“stupid” and should be “blackballed.”316 Senator Hillary Rodham
Clinton was “surprised and offended” by the decision, and accused
the Ninth Circuit panel of having “sought to undermine one of the
bedrock values of our democracy, that we are indeed ‘one nation

312. The discussion below does not attempt to discuss many of the important
constitutional issues that are relevant for determining whether “under God” violates the
Constitution. For articles discussing a broader range of constitutional issues, see Thomas C.
Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41 (2004)
(advocating the inclusion of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance primarily as a
recognition of inalienable rights and limited government rather than a profession of religious
belief); Derek H. Davis, The Pledge of Allegiance and American Values, 45 J. CHURCH & ST.
657 (2003) (examining the facts of the Newdow case, the history of the Pledge, and its “place
in defining the religious aspects of the American public philosophy”); Steven B. Epstein,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1996)
(questioning the constitutionality of religious expression in public ceremonies and images);
Alan E. Garfield, A Positive Rights Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 76 TEMP. L. REV.
281 (2003) (arguing that even if a government action is not demonstrably harmful to the
relations of church and state, it may still be unconstitutional if it fails to “do good” in
advancing the Establishment Clause’s goal of creating an inclusive and tolerant society); Steven
G. Gey, “Under God,” The Pledge of Allegiance, and Other Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C. L.
REV. 1865 (2003) (considering the nature of trivial claims in the constitutional context and
concluding that the inclusion of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge is not trivial and is
unconstitutional); Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
451 (1995) (analyzing the constitutionality of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance in schools in light of the prohibition on teacher-led prayer in schools set forth in Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)); Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and
Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN L. REV. 739 (1986) (advocating the elimination of
all references to God in official speech); Steven D. Smith, Barnette’s Big Blunder, 78 CHI.KENT L. REV. 625 (2003) (arguing that the government is not prohibited from prescribing
language such as “under God”).
313. See supra discussion accompanying note 7.
314. Press Release, White House, White House Reaction to Circuit Court Ruling (June
26, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020626-8.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2004).
315. 148 CONG. REC. S6102 (daily ed. June 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Daschle).
316. Id. at S6103 (statement of Sen. Byrd).
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under God,’ as embodied in the Pledge of Allegiance.”317 Catching
the spirit of the times, Congressman Miller said that Congress must
“respond to this outrageous decision and proclaim that these United
States are united against terrorism, united against this decision, and
united under God.”318 Within twenty-four hours after the decision
was published, both houses of Congress had passed resolutions
reaffirming the Pledge.319
The Newdow I panel subsequently amended its original opinion
in Newdow II, and the Ninth Circuit denied a rehearing en banc
(Newdow III).320 The dissenting opinions in Newdow II and Newdow
III argue that the phrase “under God” in the Pledge is
constitutional. The Newdow III opinion, dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc, combined with that of Judge Fernandez in
Newdow II provide instructive texts for analyzing the arguments
made in support of the constitutionality of the Pledge, as amended. I
will refer to these two opinions of the dissenting judges in Newdow
II and Newdow III as those of the “judges” or “dissenting judges” in
the following analysis.
The dissenting judges first identified the underlying important
values by asserting that not only has “religious tolerance and
diversity flourished in this country,” but that the United States may
take pride in the fact that it has become a “beacon for other nations
in this regard.”321 “The Constitution is a practical and balanced
charter”322 and was written for the purpose of avoiding
discrimination.323 At root, the American constitutional system
provides that “government will neither discriminate for nor
discriminate against a religion or religions.”324 The religion clauses of
the Constitution “require . . . neutrality [and] those clauses are, in
effect, an early kind of equal protection provision.”325 Like the Stasi
Commission, the dissenting judges use the great values of equality,
neutrality, and tolerance as touchstones.

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. at S6111–12 (statement of Sen. Clinton).
148 CONG. REC. H4030 (daily ed. June 26, 2002) (statement of Rep. Jeff Daniels).
See supra discussion accompanying notes 9–10.
For the Newdow decisions, see supra note 7.
Newdow III, 328 F.3d at 481 (9th Cir. 2003).
Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 492 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
Id.
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The judges then show great deference to the sensibilities of those
who wish to recite and support the Pledge. For such people, the
declaration that the United States is “under God” inspires “a vestige
of the awe all of us, including our children, must feel at the
immenseness of the universe and our own small place within it, as
well as the wonder we must feel at the good fortune of our
country.”326 In reciting the Pledge, many Americans will feel a
“healthy glow.” 327 And if the words were stricken from the Pledge, it
would “deprive[] children in public schools of the benefits derived
from those expressions.”328 In other words, the sentiments inspired
by the theological language are of high importance and removing
them would constitute a real deprivation to children. As for the
concern of plaintiff Newdow, Judge Fernandez ridicules it by
labeling it with the pejorative of “feel-good” sentiments.329 In Judge
Fernandez’s words, “although we do feel good when we contemplate
the effects of [the Pledge’s] inspiring phrasing and majestic promises,
it is not primarily [Newdow’s] feel-good prescription.”330 Thus,
remarkably, in a case involving conflicting claims on matters of
religion and conscience, a federal judge apparently finds a
constitutional distinction between something that should be
protected because it makes us “feel good” and something that is
merely “feel-good” and not worthy of protection.
The dissenting judges also cite approvingly the “public outcry
across the nation” when the “God” language was struck.331 Thus,
the judges interpret the strong passions in favor of the Pledge as
evidence confirming the correctness of their position. Although the
Newdow case involved only references to God being struck from the
Pledge, Judge Fernandez—with no citation to the record—distorts
326. Id. at 493.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 490 n.1. The judges offer no evidence whatever that children have any such
feelings or notions while they are reciting the Pledge. They similarly provide no evidence that
children attending school before the term was inserted in 1954 had any less sense of the
immenseness of the universe than did children educated after that time. Nor do they provide
any evidence that the elimination of the words from the text would have any harmful effect.
Indeed, all of the arguments for the importance of the words “under God” apparently came from
the judges’ personal beliefs, opinions, or notions.
329. Id. at 492 (“We should not permit Newdow’s feel-good concept to change that
balance.”). The interests that Newdow seeks to defend are further described as “minuscule,”
“de minimis,” and “picayune at most.” Id. at 491.
330. Id. (emphases added).
331. Newdow III, 328 F.3d at 472.
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Newdow’s actual claim and then caricatures him as a mentally
unbalanced person seeking to ban all religion from public life:
[S]uch phrases as ‘In God We Trust,’ or ‘under God’ have no
tendency to establish a religion in this country or to suppress
anyone’s exercise, or non-exercise, of religion, except in the fevered
eye of persons who most fervently would like to drive all tincture of
religion out of the public life of our polity.332

Although the Newdow case pertained only to official state
declarations of theology, and said nothing about what free citizens
should be able to say and think generally, Judge Fernandez
caricatured the plaintiff’s claim by wrongly suggesting that Newdow
wished to drive all religion out of public life. Judge Fernandez then
delivered an ad hominem attack against the emotional instability of
people like Newdow who wish to “cool [their] febrile nerves . . . at
the cost of removing the healthy glow conferred upon many citizens
when the forbidden verses, or phrases, are uttered, read, or seen.” 333
Unlike his fellow citizens, who admire their country for being a land
of “religious tolerance,”334 plaintiff Newdow is “fastidiously
intolerant and self-indulgent.”335 The judges see strong emotions in
support of “God” language as positive vindication of the rightness of
their position, while strong emotions on the other side are seen as
evidence of mental instability and intolerance, and thus a reason why
such arguments should be dismissed.
The dissenting judges believe that it is of constitutional
significance to acknowledge that there have been many references to
God in American documents, symbols, and institutions.336 These
include, according to the judges, references to God in the
Constitution,337 the Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg
332. Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 492.
333. Id. at 493.
334. Newdow III, 328 F.3d at 481.
335. Id.
336. Newdow III, 328 F.3d at 479 (“A theory of the Establishment Clause that would
have the effect of driving out of our public life the multiple references to the Divine that run
through our laws, our rituals, and our ceremonies is no theory at all.”).
337. The assertion that “the Constitution itself explicitly mentions God,” id. at 479, is
highly misleading. The only arguable reference to God is in the Constitution’s pro forma
expression “the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven,” which is a
rather weak peg on which to hang a constitutional principle. This misleading suggestion is
made in the same paragraph that begins by accusing the panel majority of having engaged in
“the purest exercise in sophistry.” Id.
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Address, the National Anthem, National Motto (“In God We
Trust”), and the judicial invocation “God save these United States
and this honorable Court,” as well as to the religious significance of
the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays.338 They believe that these
“expressions have not caused any real harm of that sort over the
years since 1791, and are not likely to do so in the future.”339 Just as
the House and Senate Reports argued that “God” could be inserted
based upon the precedents of the Mayflower Compact and other
similar references to God in American history, the Ninth Circuit
dissenting judges believed that history and traditions supported their
interpretation.
As a logical matter, the dissenting judges are not advancing a
constitutional argument when they identify the many cases where
American traditions and laws incorporated religious language and
symbols. One does not prove that an action is constitutional by
citing the number of times it has occurred any more than one proves
that murder should be legal by citing the number of times it is
committed. The issue is not the frequency in which language and
imagery refer to God, but its principled constitutionality. Even if this
point is not initially seen with regard to religion, it can easily be
understood with regard to racial discrimination. If a statute were
challenged on the grounds of racial discrimination, surely, in the
twenty-first century, we would repudiate any argument that
defended a discriminatory statute on the grounds that the
Constitution permitted slavery, that all of the founders were white,
that the Congress that adopted the Fourteenth Amendment also
enacted laws that discriminated, that many prior statutes were
discriminatory, or that the legislators who voted for the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 discriminated in their own hiring practices. The
precedents of racial discrimination, whether they appear in the
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, or in the personal
lives of the revered founders or latter-day legislators, do not provide
compelling grounds for statutory discrimination today.340 With
338. Id. Judge Fernandez identifies other examples of patriotic songs and expressions.
Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 492–93.
339. Id. at 492.
340. While we can understand today the error of arguing for racial discrimination on the
basis of American traditions, there was a time when this was not so obvious. We can now see
the notorious mistake in the Dred Scott decision when it concluded that blacks should not be
included within the phrase “all men are created equal” because the founders held slaves. Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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regard to race, it is now obvious that justifying a statute on the basis
of discriminatory traditions would be a repudiation of the principles of
equality and neutrality and not an application of them.
Moreover, the dissenters’ use of examples from the past is not
serious history; it is a sentimental voyage that exposes a fundamental
misunderstanding of what traditions mean. These traditions are
actually selected memories and symbols that were adopted,
resurrected, and sometimes even invented.341 When the dissenters
wish to invoke the founders, they cite the “God” language in the
Declaration of Independence but quickly pass over the fact that the
Constitution, the law of the land, contains no equivalent provisions.
When they want “God” in a motto, they will ignore the founders’
motto, “E Pluribus Unum” (out of many, one), in favor of one that
was coined (literally) on a two-cent piece in the midst of the Civil
War and that was codified only in the 1950s. They evoke the
Puritans when they like their references to religious beliefs, but they
ignore the Puritans when the consequences of those beliefs are
offensive. And they certainly ignore the fact that the Puritans, like
the Jehovah’s Witnesses, would have found it repugnant to pledge
allegiance to a flag.
Although the dissenting judges were quite willing to attack the
mental balance of those who oppose the “God” language in the
Pledge, they did not respond to the core argument of the majority:
A profession that we are a nation “under God” is identical, for
Establishment Clause purposes, to a profession that we are a nation
“under Jesus,” a nation “under Vishnu,” a nation “under Zeus,” or
a nation “under no god,” because none of these professions can be
neutral with respect to religion.342

Of course the declaration that the United States is a “Nation under
God” is a theological statement—and the dissenting judges fully
But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be
included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this
declaration; for if the language as understood in that day, would embrace them, the
conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence
would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted.
Id. at 410. The Court thought it was more logical to believe that blacks should not be treated
as men who were created equal than to think that actions of the founders were inconsistent or
unprincipled.
341. See THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 1–14, 263, 270–73, 279–80, 292–93 (Eric
Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1992).
342. Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 487 (majority opinion).
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acknowledge that it is at least “an undoubtedly religious reference.”343
Although the term is religious, they assert, it nevertheless is neutral.
Presumably the judges who make such a finding would have no
difficulty recognizing that it would not be a neutral act to substitute
the Arabic word for God, “Allah,” in the Pledge. Even though Allah
refers to the same Abrahamic God mentioned in the Pledge, it is
difficult to imagine that Americans would think that a pledge of
allegiance to a “Nation under Allah” would be neutral—any more
than the insertion of Zeus or Vishnu would be neutral.344 And yet
the judges argue that removing this term “confers a favored status on
atheism”345 and “affirmatively favors” nonbelief.346 Thus, we are left
with the very clear realization that the dissenting judges, like the
Stasi Commission, are defending state policies not because they are
in fact constitutionally neutral, but because they are conventionally
acceptable.
VI. CONCLUSION
To be fair to both France and the United States, it should be
recognized that each has made an important contribution to
promoting freedom of conscience. One of the principal values of
laïcité is the official respect it provides for beliefs that are not
religious and for recognizing the human dignity of the many people
who do not find strength or value in religion. Whether nonbelievers
are scientists, philosophers, doctors, political leaders, or day laborers,
they are officially respected by a laïc state for their profound
contributions to society, and they are valued as people who are fully

343. Newdow III, 328 F.3d 466, 478 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Using a very
sharp scalpel indeed, the judges acknowledge that although “under God” is “an undoubtedly
religious reference,” nevertheless having children place their hands over their hearts and
repeating those words is not a “religious act.” Id. at 478. This fine distinction reminds us of
the difference between the constitutionally protected references that make us “feel good” and
those that are unprotected because they are merely “feel-good.” See supra text accompanying
notes 329–30.
344. Despite the judges’ polemical and extreme characterizations of the motives of the
plaintiff, Newdow never requested that his theological opinions be substituted. He requested only
that theological beliefs not be decided by legislative majorities—an opinion most Americans
would presumably hold if their legislature were making theological judgments that they did
not share.
345. Newdow III, 328 F.3d at 481.
346. Id. at 482.
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entitled to participate in the political world, public discourse, and
debates about values, morality, and ethics.
With respect to the United States, there has emerged—albeit
more recently than the myth suggests—a very healthy presumption
that people of widely divergent religious beliefs should be protected
by the state and that respecting religious freedom positively aids the
health and strength of the state. Such policies and attitudes are not
only fully consistent with international human rights standards that
protect freedom of religion, they are also deeply respectful of human
dignity and the freedom of individuals to devote themselves to
religion. While some parts of the world are becoming increasingly
rational and skeptical, and while other parts of the world seem to be
increasingly religious, it is no small accomplishment for the United
States to be in the vanguard of generating scientific discovery and of
defending freedom of religion.
Both France and the United States have reason to take pride in
these positive accomplishments. But there are also serious weaknesses
in each country that appear when they fail to adhere to their
professed beliefs in equality, neutrality, and tolerance, and apply
instead their mythic versions of laïcité and religious freedom to
discriminate against others. The historical myths of laïcité and
religious freedom are inspiring largely because they have been
sanitized of the violence, intolerance, cruelty, and discrimination that
have been conducted historically in their names. Laïcité and religious
freedom did not emerge in the two countries as a consequence of
historical experiences of unity in a common cause, as is often
incorrectly imagined, but as ideologies that were often used to drive
wedges between people. The histories of the two countries are
replete with examples where laïcité and religious freedom were used
respectively to challenge the patriotism of citizens, and where verbal
and physical abuse were employed when loyalty was found lacking.
While these founding myths of laïcité and religious freedom differ in
content, they serve a remarkably similar function in the two countries
of constructing or imagining sentimental, but misleading, images of
national unity and common beliefs.
In the United States, the rhetoric of God, the flag, patriotism,
and religion has repeatedly been used to attack people of conscience.
We need look no further than at the photographs of hooded
members of the Ku Klux Klan proudly parading under the American
flag down Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C., at the same
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time that Jehovah’s Witnesses were being beaten, expelled from
schoolrooms, and assaulted in the press because they believed that
pledging allegiance to a flag was paying homage to a false idol.
Ironically, the seventeenth-century Puritans, whose legacy is
frequently invoked as evidence of a religious founding of America,
shared the sentiments about false idols of those who refused to
pledge allegiance to a flag.
In France, in the name of protecting Muslim girls against
coercion, the state has decided to force them either to remove
headscarves or to forgo a public education. The solicitude for young
people, which the Stasi Commission appropriately felt for those who
are forced to wear headscarves against their will, vanished when it
came to threats, coercion, or violence against those who wish to wear
head coverings. Such solicitude cannot be defended as a neutral
interpretation of doctrines of equality, tolerance, and separation of
religion and state; rather, it can be defended only as a part of a
mythic version of laïcité that seeks to suppress sincere religious
conviction that differs from the preferred views of the society.
The Stasi Commission and the dissenting judges in Newdow
reached conclusions regarding matters of conscience and
constitutions that were fully consistent with the popular majorities
and political powers in their respective countries, which also
conformed to the conventional national symbols, images, rhetoric,
and beliefs about unity and identity. We can imagine that the
American judges would have had no difficulty seeing the lack of
neutrality in the Stasi Commission’s solicitude for the feelings of
those who do not wish to wear the headscarf and obliviousness to
the consciences of those who do. We also can imagine that the
members of the Stasi Commission could easily see that the
expression “one Nation under God” is no more neutral than is the
expression “one Nation without a God” or “one Nation under
Allah.” Both countries, as well as the eminent scholars and jurists of
the Stasi Commission and the Ninth Circuit, have tended to
disparage those who do not want governments to decide what
students should say or not say about God and what they should or
should not wear to honor their God. In both France and the United
States, those who had beliefs differing from the national consensus
were either ignored or ridiculed.
Perhaps one day French political leaders who, in the name of
neutrality and tolerance, wish to prohibit schoolchildren from
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honoring their God by wearing head coverings might instead
understand the deepest meaning of the prayer offered by the secular,
anticlerical, godfather of tolerance and laïcité, Voltaire. In his
Treatise on Tolerance, the great skeptic himself—the person whose
life and teachings were most honored during the first Revolution—
offered his own prayer to God:
Make us help each other bear the burden of our difficult and
transient lives. May the small differences between the clothes that
cover our weak bodies, between all our inadequate languages, all
our petty customs, all our imperfect laws, all our foolish opinions,
between all of the circumstances that seem so enormous in our eyes
but so equal in Thine—may all these small nuances that distinguish
the atoms we call men not serve as a basis for hatred and
persecution. May those who light candles at noon to celebrate
Thee also sustain those who are fully satisfied with the light of Thy
sun. May those who show their love for Thee by wearing white
cloth not detest those who express their love for Thee by wearing
black wool.347

In the United States, perhaps one day the legislators who showed
their stalwart support for the Pledge of Allegiance by having their
photographs taken while reciting it on the steps of the Capitol
Building might, in their hearts, understand the deepest significance
of the words:
When you pray, you must not be like the hypocrites; for they love
to stand and pray in the synagogues and at the street corners, that
they may be seen by men. Truly I say to you, they have received
their reward. But when you pray, go into your room and shut the
door and pray to your Father who is in secret; and your Father who
sees in secret will reward you.
And in praying do not heap up empty phrases as the Gentiles do;
for they think that they will be heard for their many words. Do not
be like them.348

Unfortunately, proponents of French laïcité and American
religiosity wrap themselves in their flags and mythic identities while
forgetting that the essence of their teachers’ deepest principles—
genuine tolerance and personal piety—are greater than formulaic
347. VOLTAIRE, TRAITE SUR LA TOLERANCE ch. XXIII (1766).
348. Matthew 6:5–7.
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public utterances of belief. Possibly the French and the Americans
should recognize that, despite their obvious differences, they
resemble each other in some uncomfortably revealing ways. Perhaps
it is in Scotland—where favorable feelings toward both France and
America have long prevailed—that both might find merit in the
words of its greatest poet: what a gift it would be to see ourselves as
others see us.349

349. “O wad some Power the giftie gie us / To see oursels as ithers see us!” Robert
Burns, To a Louse: On Seeing One on a Lady’s Bonnet at Church, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ROBERT BURNS 181, 182 (James A. MacKay ed., 1986).
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